Denee L. Vaughn, ALJ Ruling 2026-5 (HHS CRD January 16, 2026)

DISMISSAL

Petitioner, Denee L. Vaughn, a former United States Department of Health and Human Services (HHS or agency) employee, requested a hearing to dispute the existence of an alleged debt owed to HHS.  On December 18, 2025, HHS filed a “Motion for Summary Judgment,”  in which it argues that Petitioner is not presently entitled to a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) in connection with the alleged debt.

As explained below, I find that summary judgment is not the appropriate mechanism for resolving the issues raised by HHS.  At the same time, I agree with HHS that Petitioner is not presently entitled to an ALJ hearing under the relevant debt laws and regulations.  I also find that even if a hearing was available, I have no legal authority to address the issues raised in Petitioner’s request for hearing.  Therefore, I dismiss Petitioner’s request for hearing in accordance with the Order below.

I.  Procedural Background

On September 26, 2025, Petitioner requested a hearing to dispute a debt allegedly owed to HHS in the gross amount of $11,272.18 (with a net total of $7.646.21 after applicable offsets).  Departmental Appeals Board (DAB) Docket (Dkt.) Entry Numbers (Nos.) 1, 1a.

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On October 4, 2025, HHS transmitted Petitioner’s hearing request to the DAB’s Civil Remedies Division for adjudication.  DAB Dkt. Entry No. 1b.  The case was docketed and assigned to me on November 13, 2025.1

On November 17, 2025, I acknowledged receipt of Petitioner’s request for hearing and issued an Order to Show Cause.  DAB Dkt. Entry No. 3.  In the Order to Show Cause, I explained I needed additional information regarding the source of the debt and Petitioner’s employment status to help identify the applicable hearing regulations.  Id. at 3.  Accordingly, I instructed HHS to file a written statement specifying whether Petitioner was a current or former HHS employee and describing the source of the alleged debt and any pending collection actions.  Id. at 4.  I also explained that Petitioner’s request for hearing was incomplete because it failed to explain why she believed the debt was invalid or incorrect.  Id. at 3-4.  Therefore, I directed Petitioner to file a written statement identifying the reasons she disputes the alleged debt.  Id. at 4.

Both parties timely responded to my Order to Show Cause.  In its response, HHS stated that Petitioner is a former employee who was separated from service effective July 14, 2025 pursuant to a Reduction in Force (RIF).  DAB Dkt. Entry No. 17 at 2.  HHS further stated that the alleged debt involves severance payments initially made to Petitioner after her separation from HHS.  Id. at 2-4.  HHS claimed the payments were made in error and that it ultimately determined Petitioner is not entitled to severance pay because she was not “employed currently for a continuous period of at least 12 months” prior to her separation.  See id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 5595(b)(1)). HHS also (incorrectly) stated that this case is governed by the salary offset regulations located at 45 C.F.R. Part 33.  Id. at 3.

In her response to the Order to Show Cause and subsequent filings, Petitioner stated that she disputes the debt because she disagrees with HHS’s position that she is not entitled to severance pay.  DAB Dkt. Entry No. 8.  Specifically, Petitioner contends HHS failed to comply with the RIF notification requirements when it processed her termination and, as a result, it misidentified the effective date of her separation.  See id.; see also DAB Dkt. Entry Nos. 24, 27.  Petitioner argues that if HHS complied with the RIF notice requirements, the effective date of her separation would have been September 14, 2025, making her eligible for severance pay.  DAB Dkt. Entry Nos. 24, 27.

On December 4, 2025, I issued a Prehearing Order outlining the procedures and deadlines governing this case.  DAB Dkt. Entry No. 25.  In the Prehearing Order, I stated that “[b]ecause Petitioner is a former HHS employee, it appears that this case is governed by the regulations located at 45 C.F.R. § 32.5.”  Id. at 3-4.  I also established deadlines for the parties to file pre-hearing exchanges and tentatively scheduled an oral hearing for December 28, 2025.  Id. at 5-7.  I explained, however, that an oral hearing would be held

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only if I determine the case “cannot be resolved by review of the documentary evidence. . . .”  Id. at 6.  I further stated that I would issue a final decision on or before January 20, 2026.  Id. at 3-4.

Both parties timely filed pre-hearing exchanges.  In her pre-hearing exchange, Petitioner reiterated her argument that she would be entitled to severance pay if HHS had complied with the RIF notice requirements.  See DAB Dkt. Entry No. 27.  In its exchange, HHS again argued that Petitioner is not entitled to severance pay under the applicable statute and, therefore, the debt is valid.  See DAB Dkt. Entry No. 26.

On December 18, 2025, after the parties had filed their pre-hearing exchanges, HHS filed the present Motion for Summary Judgment, with one supporting exhibit.  DAB Dkt. Entry Nos. 28-29.  Later the same day, Petitioner filed a response to the Motion for Summary Judgment.  DAB Dkt. Entry No. 31.

Also on December 18, 2025, I issued an Order cancelling the tentative oral hearing.  DAB Dkt., Entry No. 30.  I explained that after reviewing the parties’ filings, I had determined that this case could be resolved based on the written record.  Id.  I also stated that I would address the issues raised in HHS’s Motion for Summary Judgment as part of my final decision.  Id. at 2 n.1.

II.  Issues Addressed

The following issues are addressed in this ruling:

(1) Whether Petitioner is presently entitled to a hearing in this case under the relevant debt laws and regulations; and

(2) Even if Petitioner is entitled to a hearing, whether I have the authority to address the issues raised in Petitioner’s request for hearing.

III.  Summary Judgment vs. Dismissal

Given the issues raised in HHS’s Motion for Summary Judgment, it is important to note the distinction between summary judgment and dismissal.  Summary judgment is a mechanism which allows me to enter a final judgment on the merits without conducting a hearing.  Summary judgment is appropriate only if the record shows there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the party requesting summary judgment is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  See Senior Rehab. & Skilled Nursing Ctr., DAB No. 2300, at 3 (2010).

By contrast, dismissal is a procedural mechanism which ends the case without a final judgment on the merits.  Dismissal is appropriate if I find that some underlying flaw or

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deficiency, such as a procedural or jurisdictional issue, precludes me from conducting a hearing or deciding the merits of the case.  I may dismiss a request for hearing without prejudice, which means Petitioner may refile the case at a later date if the underlying flaw or deficiency is resolved.  Alternatively, I may dismiss a request for hearing with prejudice, which means I have found that the underlying flaw or deficiency permanently prevents Petitioner from refiling the case.

Here, in its Motion for Summary Judgment, HHS argues that Petitioner is not presently entitled to a hearing under the relevant laws and regulations.  Essentially, HHS is saying that under the present circumstances, the law does not allow me to proceed to a hearing or final decision on the merits.  Given the nature of HHS’s arguments, I find that it is appropriate to address these issues in the context of a dismissal, as opposed to summary judgment.  Therefore, I construe HHS’s Motion for Summary Judgment as a Motion to Dismiss.

IV.  Relevant Facts and Positions

For purposes of deciding whether dismissal is appropriate, I rely on the following facts and statements of the parties:2

1. Petitioner was previously employed by HHS, but resigned or was terminated from that position on May 13, 2024.  See DAB Dkt. Entry Nos. 18, 24.
2. On August 11, 2024, Petitioner was rehired by HHS to serve as an “administrative specialist” in the Office of Equal Employment Opportunity.  See DAB Dkt. Entry Nos. 18, 19, 24.
3. On March 31, 2025, HHS sent Petitioner a Specific Notice of Reduction in Force (RIF notice) stating that she would be separated from her position at the close of business on June 2, 2025.  DAB Dkt. Entry No. 20.
4. On May 22, 2025, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California issued a preliminary injunction enjoining HHS from taking further employment actions on existing RIF notices.  See Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps. v. Trump, No. 3:25-cv-03698 (N.D. Cal. May 22, 2025).
5. On July 8, 2025, the U.S. Supreme Court issued an order staying the District Court’s preliminary injunction.  See Trump v. Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps., 145 S. Ct. 2653 (2025) (No. 24A1174).

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6. On July 16, 2025, HHS sent Petitioner a Notice of Termination of Employment due to Reduction in Force (Notice of Termination).  DAB Dkt. Entry No. 21. The Notice of Termination stated that based on the U.S. Supreme Court’s stay of the preliminary injunction, HHS amended its prior RIF Notice to notify Petitioner that she was officially separated from service on July 14, 2025.  Id.
7. HHS issued a Notification of Personnel Action (SF-50) documenting Petitioner’s separation from HHS with an effective date of July 14, 2025.  DAB Dkt. Entry No. 22.  The initial SF-50 stated Petitioner was entitled to severance pay in the amount of $23,296.60, to be paid at a weekly rate of $1,943.48 over 11.99 weeks.  Id.
8. On September 4, 2025, HHS issued a “corrected” SF-50 to Petitioner.  DAB Dkt. Entry No. 23.  The corrected SF-50 informed Petitioner that she is not entitled to severance pay.  Id.
9. HHS claims the initial severance determination was made in error.  DAB Dkt. Entry No. 26 at 3.  According to HHS, Petitioner is not entitled to severance pay because she was not “employed currently for a continuous period of at least 12 months” prior to her separation.  Id. at 4 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 5595(b)(1)).
10. By letter dated October 4, 2025, the Defense Finance and Accounting Service, HHS’s payroll provider, notified Petitioner that she owed a debt to HHS in the gross amount of $11,272.18 for severance payments allegedly made in error.  DAB Dkt. Entry No. 1a at 1.
11. The debt notification letter “urged” Petitioner to repay the debt within 45 calendar days “to avoid accrual of interest at the Treasury Tax and Loan rate, penalties, administrative fees and enforced collection in accordance with 31 U.S.C. chapter 37; 31 C.F.R. chapter IX, parts 900-904; 45 C.F.R. part 30; and authorities cited therein.”  DAB Dkt. Entry No. 1a at 2.  To date, HHS has not initiated any debt collection action against Petitioner in connection with the alleged debt.  DAB Dkt. Entry No. 29.
12. The debt notification letter stated that Petitioner could request a hearing to “dispute[] the validity of the debt” by submitting an HHS Form 710 to HHS within 45 calendar days.  DAB Dkt. Entry No. 1a at 2.
13. Petitioner completed and submitted an HHS Form 710, indicating that she was requesting a hearing to dispute the validity of the alleged debt.  DAB Dkt. Entry No. 1.

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14. In support of the request for hearing, Petitioner contends HHS improperly issued the Notice of Termination on July 14, 2025, and instead was required to issue a new RIF notice providing an additional 60 days’ notice prior to her separation.  See DAB Dkt. Entry Nos. 8, 24, 27.  Petitioner argues that if HHS had provided the additional notice, her separation date would have been September 14, 2025, thereby making her eligible for severance pay.  See DAB Dkt. Entry No. 27.

V.  Discussion and Analysis

As an ALJ, I may only hold a hearing or decide an issue when the law gives me the power to do so.3  Thus, before I can address the merits of Petitioner’s case, I must first find that a statute, regulation, or other relevant legal authority both gives Petitioner a right to a hearing and gives me the authority to conduct that hearing.  If I determine that no such provision exists, then I must dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.  Cf. Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006) (explaining that if a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over a case, it “must dismiss the complaint in its entirety”).

I am authorized by law to hear and decide certain disputes involving debts owed to HHS.  The relevant laws and regulations, however, only authorize me to hear and decide a narrow set of issues after the agency has taken specific steps in connection with a disputed debt.  The laws and regulations authorizing me to conduct HHS debt hearings include: (a) the statute codified at 5 U.S.C. § 5514 and the implementing HHS regulations located at 45 C.F.R. part 33; (b) the HHS regulations located at 45 C.F.R. part 32; and (c) potentially, the HHS regulations located at 45 C.F.R. part 30.

Here, HHS contends Petitioner is not entitled to an ALJ hearing under any of the relevant laws or regulations because she is not a current federal employee and the agency has not initiated a collection action against her via a notice of administrative wage garnishment or administrative offset.  DAB Dkt. Entry No. 28 at 3.  As explained below, I agree with HHS and conclude that I am not authorized to provide Petitioner with a hearing under the present circumstances of this case.  I further find that even if a hearing was available, I do not have the authority to address the specific issues raised in Petitioner’s request for hearing.  Therefore, I conclude that I must dismiss Petitioner’s request for hearing in accordance with the Order below.

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A.  Petitioner is not entitled to a hearing under 5 U.S.C. § 5514 and 45 C.F.R. part 33.

5 U.S.C. § 5514 outlines the procedures federal agencies must follow prior to collecting a debt from a federal employee via salary offset (i.e. deductions from the employee’s regular pay).  Pursuant to the statute, the agency must provide the employee with at least 30 days’ notice of its intent to initiate salary offset and give the employee the opportunity to request a hearing to dispute the existence or amount of the debt, and/or the terms of a repayment schedule established other than by written agreement.  5 U.S.C. § 5514(a)(2).

The HHS regulations implementing 5 U.S.C. § 5514, which are located at 45 C.F.R. part 33, authorize employee salary offset hearings to be held by ALJs and outline the procedures governing such hearings.  See 45 C.F.R. §§ 33.6, 33.7(a)(2).  However, the regulations specifically define “employee” as “any individual currently employed by [a federal] agency.”  45 C.F.R. § 33.2 (emphasis added).  Here, the record shows Petitioner is no longer employed by HHS.  DAB Dkt. Entry Nos. 22, 23.  Moreover, there is no indication that HHS is seeking to initiate salary offset against Petitioner as a former employee.  See DAB Dkt. Entry Nos. 1a, 29.  Therefore, I find that Petitioner is not entitled to an ALJ hearing under 5 U.S.C. § 5514 and 45 C.F.R. part 33.

B.  Petitioner is not presently entitled to a hearing under 45 C.F.R. part 32.

The regulations located at 45 C.F.R. part 32 were promulgated to implement the administrative wage garnishment provisions of the Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996.  See 68 Fed. Reg. 15,092 (March 28, 2003).  According to the drafters, the purpose of the rule is to allow HHS “to garnish the disposable pay of non-Federal employees to collect delinquent non-tax debts owed to the United States without first obtaining a court order.”  Id. at 15,092 (Emphasis added).  Accordingly, 45 C.F.R. part 32 authorizes the HHS Secretary to issue orders to employers to withhold up to 15% of a debtor’s disposable pay.  45 C.F.R. §§ 32.6, 32.8.

Before HHS can initiate garnishment proceedings against a debtor under Part 32, the agency must provide at least 30 days’ written notice of its intent to initiate such proceedings.  45 C.F.R. § 32.4(a).  Among other requirements, the notice must also provide the debtor with an opportunity for a hearing before an ALJ or other qualified individual, “in accordance with § 32.5, concerning the existence or the amount of the debt or the terms of the proposed repayment schedule under the garnishment order. . . .”  See id. §§ 32.4(a)(3)(iii), 32.5.  In other words, a debtor is not entitled to a hearing under the administrative wage garnishment provisions unless and until HHS provides the required notice of its intent to garnish the debtor’s non-federal wages.

Here, HHS has not provided any written notice to Petitioner stating an intent to initiate administrative wage garnishment proceedings against her.  While the October 4, 2025

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debt notification letter “urges” Petitioner to repay the debt “to avoid” interest, penalties, fees, and “enforced collection action,” I find that it does not state that HHS intends to garnish Petitioner’s wages or take any other specific collection action if she fails to pay.  See DAB Dkt. Entry No. 1a.  Further, HHS provided sworn testimony stating that there are no collection actions currently pending against Petitioner.  DAB Dkt. Entry No. 29.  Because HHS has not initiated administrative garnishment proceedings by providing the required notice to Petitioner, I find that Petitioner is not presently entitled to a hearing under 45 C.F.R. part 32.

C.  Petitioner is not presently entitled to a hearing under 45 C.F.R. part 30.

The regulations located at 45 C.F.R. part 30 outline the general procedures HHS follows in claims and debt collection actions.  Potentially relevant here, 45 C.F.R. § 30.12 provides the procedures applicable to administrative offset, which is when the government withholds funds owed to the debtor to satisfy a debt.  See 45 C.F.R. § 30.2 (defining “administrative offset”).

45 C.F.R. § 30.12 states that administrative offset “may be initiated only after the debtor has been sent written notice of the type and amount of the debt” and “the intention of the Department to initiate administrative offset to collect the debt.”  45 C.F.R. § 30.12(c)(2)(i).  The notice must also provide the debtor with “the opportunity for a review within the Department of the determination of indebtedness.”  45 C.F.R. § 30.12(c)(2)(ii)(C).  Thus, similar to the administrative wage garnishment regulations discussed above, a debtor’s right to request departmental review does not accrue under this section unless and until HHS provides written notice of its intent to initiate administrative offset.

It is also important to note that while the departmental review process in Part 30 includes the opportunity for an “oral hearing” or a “paper hearing,” the provisions specifically state that the review is to be provided by the “Secretary.”  45 C.F.R. § 30.12(e).

The regulation defines “Secretary” as “the Secretary of Health and Human Services, or the Secretary’s designee.”  45 C.F.R. § 30.2.  Unlike the other debt regulations, there is no language indicating that the review will be provided by an ALJ, nor am I aware of any Secretarial designation authorizing me to conduct any review under this section.  Thus, even when the departmental review provisions are triggered, my authority to conduct a hearing under Part 30 is not entirely clear.

In any event, HHS has not yet issued a notice to Petitioner stating it intends to collect the alleged debt via administrative offset.  Again, the debt notification letter does not state that HHS intends to initiate any specific collection action against Petitioner and HHS provided sworn testimony stating that there are no collection actions currently pending against Petitioner.  See DAB Dkt. Entry Nos. 1a, 29.  Because HHS has not initiated

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administrative offset by providing the required notice to Petitioner, I find that Petitioner is not presently entitled to departmental review under 45 C.F.R. § 30.12.

D.  Petitioner has not identified any law or regulation which authorizes me to conduct a hearing in this case.

In response to HHS’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Petitioner claims she is entitled to a hearing “as a previous employee of HHS and the fact that my RIF was not done properly.”  DAB Dkt. Entry No. 31.  Petitioner’s response includes screenshots from the Office of Personnel Management website with guidance on federal agency RIF procedures.  See id.

Petitioner’s filing is not directly responsive to the jurisdictional issues raised by HHS because it does not address Petitioner’s hearing rights under the relevant debt regulations.  Further, Petitioner does not identify any other law or regulation that authorizes me to conduct a hearing in this case.  As discussed in the next section, I have no legal authority to hear or decide any issues involving Petitioner’s separation or the underlying RIF process.  Therefore, I find that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that she is presently entitled to a hearing in connection with the alleged debt.

E.  The issues raised by Petitioner fall outside the scope of my limited authority and cannot be addressed in this forum.

Finally, even if Petitioner were entitled to a hearing, I would find that she has not identified any issues I am authorized to decide.  Petitioner’s entire case is predicated on her claim that HHS failed to comply with the RIF notification requirements and improperly determined the effective date of her separation.  In other words, Petitioner is not directly disputing the existence or amount of the debt but is instead attempting to challenge the agency’s RIF process and her date of separation, which are well outside the limited scope of my authority in a debt case.

While I acknowledge that Petitioner is frustrated with the agency’s handling of her severance determination, none of the relevant HHS debt regulations permit me to provide the type of review or afford the type of relief she is seeking.  My authority in a debt case generally consists of a “review of the documentary evidence to confirm the existence or amount of a debt or the terms of a repayment schedule.”  45 C.F.R. § 30.2 (defining “hearing”); 45 C.F.R. § 32.2 (same); 45 C.F.R. § 33.2 (same).4  Nothing in the underlying

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regulations authorizes me to review, decide, or address any aspect of Petitioner’s separation from HHS or the agency’s RIF procedures.  Nor do I have any authority to change Petitioner’s date of separation, invalidate the Notice of Termination, or order the agency to issue a new RIF notice.  Instead, any dispute concerning Petitioner’s date of separation or the underlying RIF process falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Merit System Protection Board and must be resolved in that forum.  See 5 CFR § 351.901.

Simply put, Petitioner has not identified any reviewable dispute in this case concerning the existence or amount of the debt or the terms of any repayment schedule.  Instead, Petitioner is asking me to go beyond the documentary evidence, review the agency’s RIF process, and change the effective date of her separation, none of which I am authorized to do under the relevant debt regulations.  Therefore, even if Petitioner were presently entitled to a hearing, I would still find that I lack jurisdiction to hear or decide the issues raised in the request for hearing.

VI.  Order

For the reasons stated above, I conclude that Petitioner is not presently entitled to a hearing on the alleged debt and, in any event, has not identified any issues I am legally authorized to decide.  Therefore, I hereby ORDER as follows:

• Petitioner’s request for hearing is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE insofar as Petitioner may exercise any available right to a hearing or review regarding the alleged debt if HHS initiates a qualifying collection action in the future;5 and
• Petitioner’s request for hearing is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE to the extent it requests review in this forum of any aspect of the agency’s RIF process and/or the effective date of Petitioner’s separation from employment.