Kaylee Jo Boland, DAB, CR6926, (2026)

DECISION

Petitioner, Kaylee Jo Boland, is excluded from participation in Medicare, Medicaid, and all federal health care programs pursuant to section 1128(a)(4) of the Social Security Act (Act) (42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(a)(4)), effective December 18, 2025.  Petitioner’s exclusion for the minimum period of five years is required by section 1128(c)(3)(B) of the Act (42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(c)(3)(B)).1 

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I.  Background

The Inspector General of the United States Department of Health and Human Services (IG) notified Petitioner by letter dated November 28, 2025, that she was excluded from participation in Medicare, Medicaid, and all federal health care programs for five years.  The IG cited section 1128(a)(4) of the Act as the authority for Petitioner’s exclusion.  The IG stated that the exclusion was based on Petitioner’s felony conviction in the Circuit Court of the Third Judicial Circuit, Madison County, Illinois (state court) of a criminal offense related to the unlawful manufacture, distribution, prescription, or dispensing of a controlled substance.  IG Exhibit (IG Ex.) 1 at 1; Petitioner’s Exhibit (P. Ex.) 3 at 1. 

On January 29, 2026, Petitioner timely filed a request for hearing (RFH) before an administrative law judge (ALJ).  On February 4, 2026, the case was assigned to me to hear and decide.  I convened a telephone prehearing conference on February 25, 2026, the substance of which is memorialized in my Prehearing Conference Order and Schedule for Filing Briefs and Documentary Evidence issued on February 26, 2026 (Prehearing Order).  Petitioner has not waived an oral hearing.  Prehearing Order ¶ 5. 

On April 2, 2026, the IG filed a motion for summary judgment and a supporting brief (IG Br.) with IG Exs. 1 through 6.  On May 28, 2026, Petitioner filed her objection to CMS’ motion for summary judgment and supporting brief (P. Br.).  Petitioner also filed on May 28, 2026, P. Exs. 1 and 3 through 5.  Petitioner did not file a document marked P. Ex. 2.  But Petitioner’s exhibit list filed May 28, 2026, lists P. Ex. 2 as the document marked Exhibit B that Petitioner filed with her request for hearing on January 29, 2026 (Departmental Appeals Board Electronic Filing System (DAB E-File) # 1c).  Therefore, DAB E-File # 1c is treated as marked as P. Ex. 2.  On May 29, 2026, the IG filed a reply brief (IG Reply). 

Petitioner objected to the admission of and my consideration of IG Exs. 2 and 6 as evidence.  Petitioner objects to IG Ex. 2 on grounds that it is irrelevant and highly prejudicial hearsay.  Petitioner also objects that she had no opportunity to cross-examine the author of P. Ex. 2 in the criminal proceedings.  Petitioner objects to IG Ex. 6 because it is irrelevant and highly prejudicial.  P. Br. at 4-5.  I must exclude irrelevant or immaterial evidence.  42 C.F.R. § 1005.17(c).  Relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or possible delay due to the admission of cumulative evidence.  42 C.F.R. § 1005.17(d).  An ALJ determines the admissibility of evidence and is not bound by the Federal Rules of Evidence but refers to them as appropriate.  42 C.F.R. § 1005.17(a)-(b).  Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, the test for whether evidence is relevant is whether the evidence has “any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence;” and “the fact is of consequence in determining the action.”  Fed. R. Evid. 401.  The only issue before me is whether there is a basis to exclude Petitioner.  The reasonableness of the period of exclusion, which is the minimum period authorized

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in this case, is not at issue before me.  42 C.F.R. § 1001.2007(a)(1), (2).  The elements that trigger exclusion under section 1128(a)(4) of the Act are whether: Petitioner was convicted of a felony criminal offense under federal or state law; the offense occurred after August 21, 1996; and the offense is related to the unlawful manufacture, distribution, prescription, or dispensing of a controlled substance.  Act § 1128(a)(4); 42 C.F.R. § 1001.101(d). 

IG Ex. 2 is an Illinois State Police Investigative Report dated December 28, 2022.  The report includes allegations, which according to the IG, are related to Petitioner’s offense.  IG Reply at 2.  Petitioner is correct that IG Ex. 2 is hearsay but the fact that a document is hearsay does not require its exclusion as evidence.  Only if irrelevant or immaterial must evidence be excluded.  42 C.F.R. § 1005.17(c).  IG Ex. 2 is both relevant and material within the meaning of Fed. R. Evid. 401.  The fact IG Ex. 2 includes hearsay does not require its exclusion.  The hearsay nature of the document is recognized.  The real issue is what weight should be accorded to the exhibit.  But as explained later because I am resolving this case on summary judgment, I do not weigh the evidence.  Rather, I consider the evidence in a light most favorable to Petitioner as the nonmovant and a draw all reasonable inferences in Petitioner’s favor.  Petitioner’s argument that she had no opportunity to cross-examine the author of P. Ex. 2 in the criminal proceedings is not a basis for exclusion of the evidence.  Petitioner elected to plead guilty to one count of the information filed in the state court and, thereby, waived the right to confront and cross-examine the author.  Additionally, Petitioner may not collaterally attack in this proceeding her conviction that is the basis for the exclusion.  42 C.F.R. § 1001.2007(d). 

IG Ex. 6 is a consent order entered by the Illinois Department of Financial and Professional Regulation, Division of Professional Regulation with agreement of Petitioner.  IG Ex. 6.  The IG argues that IG Ex. 6 is relevant because in the consent order Petitioner admits to facts related to the conduct for which she was charged that establishes at least one element of the IG prima facie case for exclusion under section 1128(a)(4) of the Act.  In fact, my reading of the consent order is that Petitioner stipulated to facts set out in the consent order and not just to allegations that if proved might be a basis for discipline.  IG Ex. 6 at 1.  IG Ex. 6 is relevant and there is no risk for undue prejudice to Petitioner for the same reasons discussed related to IG Ex. 2.  Additionally, before me Petitioner does not deny the underling acts for which she was charged in the state court and those facts are not in dispute.  Rather, Petitioner’s argument before me is that the IG has no basis for exclusion because she was not convicted by the state court of the alleged acts.  P. Br. at 5-7. 

Petitioner did not object to my consideration of IG Exs. 1 and 3 through 5.  Accordingly, IG Exs. 1 through 6 are admitted and considered as evidence. 

The IG did not object to my consideration of P. Exs. 1 through 5, which are relevant and material, and all are admitted and considered as evidence. 

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II.  Discussion

A.  Applicable Law

Section 1128(f) of the Act (42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(f)) establishes Petitioner’s right to a hearing by an ALJ and judicial review of the final action of the Secretary of Health and Human Services (the Secretary). 

Pursuant to section 1128(a)(4) of the Act, the Secretary must exclude from participation in any federal health care program any individual convicted of a felony criminal offense under federal or state law, that occurred after August 21, 1996, related to the unlawful manufacture, distribution, prescription, or dispensing of a controlled substance.  Act § 1128(a)(4).  The Secretary has promulgated regulations implementing this provision of the Act.  42 C.F.R. § 1001.101(d). 

Pursuant to section 1128(i) of the Act (42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(i)), an individual is convicted of a criminal offense when:  (1) a judgment of conviction has been entered against him or her in a federal, state, or local court whether an appeal is pending or the record of the conviction is expunged; (2) there is a finding of guilt by a court; (3) a plea of guilty or no contest is accepted by a court; or (4) the individual has entered into any arrangement or program where judgment of conviction is withheld. 

Section 1128(c)(3)(B) of the Act provides that an exclusion imposed under section 1128(a) of the Act will be for a period of no fewer than five years.  42 C.F.R. § 1001.102(a).  The Secretary has published regulations that establish aggravating factors that the IG may consider to extend the period of exclusion beyond the minimum five-year period, as well as mitigating factors that may be considered only if the minimum five-year period is extended.  42 C.F.R. § 1001.102(b), (c).  The IG imposed the minimum authorized five-year exclusion and aggravating and mitigating factors are not relevant in this case.  IG Ex. 5 at 1. 

The standard of proof is a preponderance of the evidence.  42 C.F.R. § 1001.2007(c).  Petitioner bears the burden of proof and the burden of persuasion on any affirmative defenses or mitigating factors, and the IG bears the burden on all other issues.  Prehearing Order ¶ 4; 42 C.F.R. § 1005.15(b), (c).  There may be no collateral attack of the conviction that is the basis for the exclusion.  42 C.F.R. § 1001.2007(d). 

B.  Issues

The Secretary has by regulation limited my scope of review to two issues: 

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Whether the IG has a basis for excluding an individual or entity from participating in Medicare, Medicaid, and all other federal health care programs; and

Whether the length of the exclusion is unreasonable. 

42 C.F.R. § 1001.2007(a)(1). 

When, as in this case, the IG imposes the minimum authorized five-year exclusion under section 1128(a) of the Act, there is no issue as to whether the period of exclusion is unreasonable.  42 C.F.R. § 1001.2007(a)(2). 

C.  Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Analysis

My conclusions of law are set forth in bold text followed by my findings of fact and analysis. 

1.  Petitioner timely filed her hearing request and I have jurisdiction. 

There is no dispute that Petitioner timely requested a hearing and that I have jurisdiction pursuant to section 1128(f) of the Act and 42 C.F.R. pt. 1005. 

2.  Summary judgment is appropriate in this case. 

Pursuant to section 1128(f) of the Act, a person subject to exclusion has the right to reasonable notice and an opportunity for a hearing.  The Secretary has provided by regulation that a sanctioned party has the right to a hearing before an ALJ, and both the sanctioned party and the IG have a right to participate in the hearing.  42 C.F.R. § 1005.2 .3.  Either or both parties may choose to waive appearance at an oral hearing and to submit only documentary evidence and written argument for my consideration.  42 C.F.R. § 1005.6(b)(5).  An ALJ may also resolve a case, in whole or in part, by summary judgment.  42 C.F.R. § 1005.4(b)(12).  Petitioner has not waived an oral hearing. 

Summary judgment is appropriate in an exclusion case when there are no disputed issues of material fact and when the undisputed facts, clear and not subject to conflicting interpretation, demonstrate that one party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Tanya A. Chuoke, R.N., DAB No. 1721 (2000); David A. Barrett, DAB No. 1461 (1994); Robert C. Greenwood, DAB No. 1423 (1993); Thelma Walley, DAB No. 1367 (1992); Catherine L. Dodd, R.N., DAB No. 1345 (1992); John W. Foderick, M.D., DAB No. 1125 (1990).  When the undisputed material facts of a case support summary judgment, there is no need for a full evidentiary hearing, and neither party has the right to one.  Surabhan Ratanasen, M.D., DAB No. 1138 (1990); Foderick, DAB No. 1125.  In opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must

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show that there are material facts that remain in dispute, and that those facts either affect the proponent’s prima facie case or might establish a defense.  Garden City Med. Clinic, DAB No. 1763 (2001); Everett Rehab. & Med. Ctr., DAB No. 1628 (1997).  It is insufficient for the nonmovant to rely upon mere allegations or denials to defeat the motion and proceed to a hearing.  Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986). 

There are no genuine disputes of material fact in this case.  Petitioner’s argument is that she was not convicted.  The issue must be resolved against Petitioner as a matter of law.  Accordingly, summary judgment is appropriate. 

3.  Section 1128(a)(4) of the Act requires Petitioner’s exclusion from participation in Medicare, Medicaid, and all other federal health care programs. 

a.  Facts

On August 14, 2023, an information was filed in the state court.  The information charged Petitioner with one count of unlawful possession of a controlled substance, a felony.  The charge alleged that Petitioner knowingly and unlawfully possessed less than 15 grams of a substance containing morphine, a Schedule 2 controlled substance other than as authorized under state law.  Petitioner was also charged with one count of unlawful acquisition of a controlled substance, a felony.  The charge alleged that Petitioner knowingly and unlawfully acquired or obtained possession of a substance that contained morphine, a Schedule 2 controlled substance by misrepresentation, fraud, forgery, deception, or subterfuge in violation of state law.  IG Ex. 3. 

An order of the state court dated January 27, 2025, shows that Petitioner entered a plea of guilty to count 1 of the information that charged possession of a controlled substance and count 2 of the information was dismissed.  IG Ex. 5.  An order of the state court dated May 29, 2025, that was filed in the state court on May 30, 2025, shows that Petitioner pleaded guilty to count 1 of the information, which charged unlawful possession of a controlled substance.  P. Ex. 1.  Petitioner concedes that she pleaded guilty.  P. Br. at 5.  The order filed in the state court on May 30, 2025, indicates that count 2 of the information was dismissed.  The order indicates that Petitioner stipulated to a factual basis supporting her guilty plea.  The state court accepted the guilty plea, entered a finding of guilt, but deferred entering judgment.  Petitioner was sentenced to two years of probation.   The order provided that upon successful completion of probation the case would be dismissed.  P. Ex. 1 at 1; P. Ex. 2; IG Ex. 4 at 1, 7.  Petitioner alleges, and I accept as true for purposes of summary judgment, that on completion of probation through early termination or upon completion of the term of probation, the criminal charge will be dismissed by the state court and Petitioner will no longer have a state court conviction.  P. Br. at 5-7. 

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On November 28, 2025, the IG notified Petitioner of her exclusion pursuant to section 1128(a)(4) from participation in all federal health care programs for five years based on her state court conviction.  P. Ex. 3; IG Ex. 1 at 1. 

Petitioner states in her declaration dated May 28, 2026, that pursuant to her plea agreement an order for deferred judgment was issued by the stated court on May 29, 2025.  She was sentenced to two years of probation, and upon completion of probation the state criminal charge was to be dismissed.  She states that she has been compliant with the terms of her probation.  She states that she completed one year of probation on May 27, 2026, and was filing a petition for early termination of probation in the state court that she expected would be granted and result in early termination of her probation and dismissal of the state charge.  She states that both her probation officers intended to provide letters supporting her.  She states that she is a single mother of a child with special needs.  She states she pleaded guilty to reduce the financial burden and stress of a trial.  She states that she was pregnant at the time she entered her guilty plea.  She states she believes that she would have been found not guilty if the case had gone to trial.  She states that she is not the subject of any other criminal, administrative, regulatory, patient, employment, or any practice related concern or action.  P. Ex. 5.  I accept Petitioner’s assertions as true for purposes of summary judgment. 

I advised the parties in the Prehearing Order that on summary judgment: 

[A] fact alleged in briefing and not specifically denied, may be accepted as true for purposes of a motion or cross-motion for summary judgment. 

Prehearing Order ¶ 8.  The IG alleges citing IG Exs. 2 and 6 that Petitioner’s conviction of possession of a controlled substance was related to the unlawful manufacture, distribution, prescription, or dispensing of a controlled substance within the meaning of section 1128(a)(4) of the Act because Petitioner obtained the drugs that she possessed from her residents or patients.  The IG asserts that on December 27, 2022, Petitioner who was a nurse working in a nursing home failed to give four residents under her care their prescribed controlled substances, including morphine and unlawfully dispensed or distributed the drug by diverting the morphine for her own use.  The IG asserts that the charge against Petitioner was based Petitioner’s possession of the morphine she diverted to her own use.  IG Br. at 1, 3, 6.  Petitioner does not deny in her declaration that the drugs she possessed and for which she was convicted were drugs that she was supposed to dispense to nursing home residents under her care that she distributed or dispensed to herself rather than to her assigned residents.  P. Ex. 5.  Petitioner admits in her brief that she was also charged with unlawful acquisition of a controlled substance but points out that that charge was dismissed.  P. Br. at 4.  The information filed against Petitioner in the state court lists the charge of unlawful acquisition of a controlled substance,

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specifically that she obtained morphine by misrepresentation, fraud, forgery, deception, or subterfuge.  IG Ex. 3.  P. Ex. 1 and IG Ex. 5 show that the charge of unlawful acquisition of a controlled substance was dismissed.  Petitioner objected to IG Exs. 2 and 6 on grounds they were not relevant and prejudicial (P. Br. at 4-5) and the objections have been overruled.  Petitioner concedes that: 

She was a health care practitioner;

She was convicted of a felony criminal offense;

The offense of which she was convicted was related to the unlawful manufacture, distribution, prescription, or dispensing of a controlled substance; and

Her offense occurred after August 21, 1996. 

P. Br. at 5.  Petitioner’s only challenge to her exclusion by the IG is that she “has not received a permanent felony conviction.”  P. Br. at 5; RFH at 2.  But Petitioner does not deny in briefing that she obtained the controlled substance she was convicted of possessing by not distributing or dispensing the drug to nursing home residents under her care but, rather, diverted the drug to her own use or possession, even though that is specifically alleged by the IG.  P. Br.; RFH. 

b.  Analysis

Section 1128(a)(4) of the Act provides: 

(a) Mandatory Exclusion.—The Secretary shall exclude the following individuals and entities from participation in any Federal health care program (as defined in section 1128B(f)): 

* * * *

(4) Felony conviction relating to controlled substance.—Any individual or entity that has been convicted for an offense which occurred after the date of the enactment of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, under Federal or State law, of a criminal offense consisting of a felony relating to the unlawful manufacture, distribution, prescription, or dispensing of a controlled substance. 

Therefore, Congress required that the Secretary exclude from federal health programs any individual or entity: 

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1.  Convicted of a federal or state felony offense;

2.  The offense occurred after August 21, 1996 (date of enactment of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996); and

3.  The offense was related to the unlawful manufacture, distribution, prescription, or dispensing of a controlled substance. 

Petitioner concedes that she was charged with a felony offense of possession of a controlled substance that occurred after August 21, 1996.  She does not dispute that she pleaded guilty to the offense.  She does not dispute that the state court accepted her guilty plea to the offense, found her guilty and sentenced her to two years of probation.  Petitioner does not dispute that the offense of which she was convicted was related to the unlawful manufacture, distribution, prescription, or dispensing of a controlled substance.  P. Br. at 4-5; RFH at 2; P. Ex. 5. 

Under 1128(a)(4) exclusion is required for a conviction of a felony offense related to the unlawful manufacture, distribution, prescription, or dispensing of a controlled substance.  Act § 1128(a)(4).  Petitioner was convicted of possession of a controlled substance and not one of the specific acts listed in section 1128(a)(4) of the Act.  The IG argues that there is a nexus between the offense of which Petitioner was convicted and the types of offenses listed in section 1128(a)(4).  The charge to which Petitioner pleaded guilty alleged the conduct occurred on or about December 27, 2022.  IG Ex. 3.  In the state administrative consent order, Petitioner conceded that on or about December 27, 2022, she “charted giving four different residents narcotics” that the residents denied receiving.  IG Ex. 6 at 1.  Petitioner did not admit to receiving or possessing any drugs on or about December 27, 2022, in the consent order.  IG Ex. 6.  The Illinois State Police Investigative Report dated December 28, 2022, reports that multiple residents alleged that on or about December 27, 2022, they did not receive pain medication from Petitioner that they were prescribed.  The report alleged that the investigator was told by Petitioner’s Administrator and Director of Nursing that they watched surveillance video showing that Petitioner took bottles of morphine and placed them in her pocket.  IG Ex. 2 at 1-2.  Petitioner does not address, deny, or dispute these allegations of the IG.  I gave the parties notice in the Prehearing Order ¶ 8, that I may accept as true any fact alleged on summary judgment and not specifically denied by the nonmovant.  I conclude it is appropriate to consider the facts alleged by the IG regarding Petitioner’s distribution or dispensing of the controlled substances to herself rather than dispensing them to the nursing home residents under her care.  I consider these facts only to confirm what is not disputed by Petitioner, i.e., that the offense of which she was convicted was related to the unlawful manufacture, distribution, prescription, or dispensing of a controlled substance. 

Appellate panels of the Departmental Appeals Board (the Board) have long held that the statutory terms describing an offense do not control whether that offense is “related to”

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the delivery of a health care item or service under Medicare or a state health care program for purposes of an exclusion pursuant to section 1128(a) of the Act.  Rather, an ALJ and the Board must determine whether there is a commonsense connection or nexus between the offense and the delivery of a health care item or service.  An ALJ and the Board consider evidence as to the nature of the offense and the facts that were the basis for the conviction.  Kimbrell Colburn, DAB No. 2683 at 5 (2016); Scott D. Augustine, DAB No. 2043 at 5-6 (2006); Berton Siegel, D.O., DAB No. 1467 at 6-7 (1994); Dewayne Franzen, DAB No. 1165 (1990).  An ALJ may also use extrinsic evidence to “[fill] in the circumstances surrounding the events which formed the basis for the offense of which Petitioner was convicted.”  Narendra M. Patel, M.D., DAB No. 1736 at 7 (2000), aff’d, Patel v. Thompson, 319 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 959 (2003).  In Patel, the Board specifically rejected the position that all elements necessary for exclusion must be found in the record of the state criminal court.  Id. at 10.  The terms “related to” and “relating to” in section 1128(a) of the Act simply mean that there must be a nexus or commonsense connection.  Friedman v. Sebelius, 686 F.3d 813, 820 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (describing the phrase “relating to” as “deliberately expansive words,” “the ordinary meaning of [which] is a broad one,” and one that is not subject to “crabbed and formalistic interpretation”) (internal quotes omitted); Quayum v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 34 F. Supp. 2d 141, 143 (E.D.N.Y. 1998).  Based on these prior Board decisions, it is necessary for me to consider not only the charge of which Petitioner was convicted and related court records, but also all the extrinsic evidence of record that shows the basis for the charge.  The federal courts have recognized that Congress intended that even a loose connection is sufficient to trigger exclusion under section 1128(a)(2) of the Act.  Friedman, 686 F.3d 813, 820; Quayum, 34 F. Supp. 2d 141, 143. 

In deciding this case on summary judgment, I rely only upon the undisputed facts and draw all reasonable inferences in Petitioner’s favor.  I conclude that the preponderance of the evidence in this case shows that there is a common-sense connection between Petitioner’s offense of possession of the controlled substance morphine that Petitioner did not dispense to nursing home residents in her care but converted to her own possession or use by distributing and dispensing the drug to herself. 

The second and third elements that trigger exclusion under section 1128(a)(4) of the Act are satisfied. 

Petitioner challenges her exclusion arguing that she was not convicted within the meaning of section 1128(i) of the Act, the first element of section 1128(a)(4) of the Act.  I disagree. 

Section 1128(i) of the Act establishes four circumstances when one is considered convicted for purposes of exclusion under the Act.  An individual or entity is considered “convicted” of an offense if: 

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(1) A judgment of conviction has been entered against one by a federal, state, or local court, even if an appeal is pending or the judgment of conviction or other record has been expunged.  Act § 1128(i)(1). 

(2) There is a finding of guilt by a federal, state, or local court.  Act § 1128(i)(2). 

(3) A plea of guilty or nolo contendere (no contest) has been accepted by a federal, state, or local court. Act § 1128(i)(3). 

(4) The individual or entity entered a first offender, deferred adjudication, or other arrangement or program where judgment of conviction was withheld.  Act § 1128(i)(4). 

I conclude Petitioner was convicted within the meaning of section 1128(i)(2), (3), and (4) of the Act. 

Petitioner was convicted within the meaning of section 1128(i)(2) and (3) of the Act.  The January 27, 2025 state court order shows that Petitioner entered a plea of guilty to count 1 of the information that charged possession of a controlled substance and count 2 of the information was dismissed.  IG Ex. 5.  The May 29, 2025 state court order shows that Petitioner pleaded guilty to count 1 of the information, which charged unlawful possession of a controlled substance.  P. Ex. 1.  Petitioner concedes that she pleaded guilty.  P. Br. at 5.  The state court accepted the guilty plea, entered a finding of guilt, but deferred entering judgment.  Petitioner was sentenced to two years of probation.  The order provided that upon successful completion of probation that case would be dismissed.  P. Ex. 1 at 1; P. Ex. 2; IG Ex. 4 at 1, 7. 

The facts also show that Petitioner was convicted within the meaning of section 1128(i)(4) because the state court withheld a judgment of conviction and provided that upon successful completion of probation the charge against Petitioner would be dismissed.  The state court action was pursuant to an Illinois first offender program under 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 570/410 which provides that the deferred judgment will not be considered a conviction under Illinois law unless the state court finds that there is a violation of the terms of probation and enters judgment upon its original findings of guilt.  720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 570/410 (a), (e).  However, the Illinois statues provides that the disposition of probation is considered a conviction for purposes of imposing the conditions of probation.  720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 570/410(g).  The Illinois statute supports my conclusion that Petitioner was convicted by the state court. 

Accordingly, I conclude that all elements necessary to trigger exclusion pursuant to section 1128(a)(4) of the Act are satisfied in this case, and that Petitioner’s exclusion is mandated by section 1128(a)(4) of the Act. 

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4.  Section 1128(c)(3)(B) of the Act requires a minimum exclusion of five years for an exclusion pursuant to section 1128(a) of the Act. 

I have concluded that there is a basis to exclude Petitioner pursuant to section 1128(a)(4) of the Act.  Therefore, the minimum period of exclusion authorized by Congress in section 1128(c)(3)(B) of the Act is five years.  Nenice Marie Andrews, DAB No. 2656 at 5 (2015); Scott D. Augustine, DAB No. 2043 at 13-14 (2006). 

5.  Petitioner’s exclusion for five years is not unreasonable as a matter of law. 

Congress has established a five-year minimum period of exclusion for exclusions pursuant to section 1128(a) of the Act.  Act § 1128(c)(3)(B).  Pursuant to 42 C.F.R. § 1001.2007(a)(2), when the IG imposes an exclusion in accordance with section 1128(a) of the Act for the statutory minimum period of five years, there is no issue of whether the period is unreasonable.  Accordingly, I conclude that Petitioner’s exclusion for a period of five years is not unreasonable as a matter of law. 

Petitioner’s arguments related to why she decided to plead guilty in the state court may be viewed as a request for equitable relief.  However, I have no authority to grant Petitioner any equitable relief.  Matthew J. Girardy, DMD, DAB No. 2987 at 7 (2020).  Congress required Petitioner’s exclusion pursuant to section 1128(a)(2) of the Act, the regulation establishes the effective date of a mandatory exclusion, and those requirements are binding upon me.  I am bound to follow the Act and the Secretary’s regulations.  42 C.F.R. § 1005.4(c)(1). 

Exclusion is effective 20 days from the date of the IG’s written notice of exclusion to the affected individual or entity.  42 C.F.R. § 1001.2002(b).  The IG’s notice to Petitioner is dated November 28, 2022.  IG Ex. 1 at 1; P. Ex. 3.  Accordingly, the effective date of Petitioner’s exclusion is December 18, 2022. 

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III.  Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner is excluded from participation in Medicare, Medicaid, and all other federal health care programs for a minimum of five years, effective December 18, 2025.