Ingrid Gordon-Patterson, Ruling No. 2025-1 (2025)

Department of Health and Human Services
DEPARTMENTAL APPEALS BOARD
Appellate Division

Ingrid Gordon-Patterson

Docket No. A-25-44
Ruling No. 2025-1
Decision No. 3171
April 14, 2025

RULING DENYING REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION

Petitioner Ingrid Gordon-Patterson, appearing pro se, submitted a filing that the Board has accepted as a request to reconsider its decision in the case of Ingrid Gordon-Patterson, DAB No. 3171 (2025). The Board declined review and summarily affirmed a ruling by an administrative law judge (ALJ) dismissing Petitioner’s hearing request under 42 C.F.R. § 1005.2(e)(1) because it was not timely filed and Petitioner failed to make a “reasonable showing” to rebut the presumption of receipt of the Inspector General (IG) exclusion notice. Ingrid Gordon-Patterson, CRD Docket No. C-23-705, Ruling No. 2025-4 (Nov. 12, 2024).

The regulations in 42 C.F.R. Part 1005 governing appeals of exclusions do not expressly authorize the Board to “reopen and reconsider its decisions or vest the Board with continuing jurisdiction over a case after it has issued its decision.” Charles Brian Griffin, Ruling on Request for Reconsideration, DAB Ruling No. 2017-3, at 2 (May 10, 2017); Mark B. Kabins, M.D., Ruling on Motion for Reconsideration, DAB Ruling No. 2012-1, at 2-3 (Oct. 14, 2011).1 Nonetheless, “[t]he Board has recognized . . . that it has inherent authority to reopen and reconsider a decision under the general principle that an adjudicator may act to correct an error in a decision.” Rosa Velia Serrano, Ruling on Petitioner’s Motion to Reconsider and Supplement the Record, DAB Ruling No. 2019-2, at 5 (April 25, 2019) (citing Griffin at 2; Kabins at 2-3).2 However, “reopening a Board decision ‘is not a routine step’ in the Board’s adjudication process.” Id. (citing Kabins at 3). “Rather, ‘it is the means for the parties and the Board to point out and correct any errors that make the decision clearly wrong.’” Id. The Board emphasized that “[a] ‘motion for reconsideration is not a vehicle for an aggrieved party to repeat arguments already made and rejected.’” Id.

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Applying the standards for reconsideration in this case, we conclude that Petitioner’s filing does not establish any clear legal or factual error in DAB No. 3171. In fact, Petitioner merely re-submitted prior documentation. Specifically, Petitioner submitted a cover page directed to the “Appellate Division” with a copy of her prior request for review and the Board’s acknowledgment letter and attachments from the previously docketed case of A-25-13, which resulted in DAB No. 3171. Petitioner submitted no material that the Board had not previously reviewed prior to its decision. Further, Petitioner did not submit any additional argument nor even explicitly request reconsideration.

There is evidence that Petitioner did not receive the Board’s decision in DAB No. 3171. The decision was sent by certified mail to Petitioner as she had not obtained a DAB e-file account nor requested a waiver as explained in the acknowledgment letter. However, the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) attempted delivery and left a notice, and later reminded the recipient to schedule redelivery, but two weeks later returned the certified mail to the Board as undeliverable. Thus, we have appended DAB No. 3171 and the USPS tracking receipt to this ruling, which is being sent to Petitioner by certified mail with waiver of signature, and facsimile.

Petitioner’s request for reconsideration does not identify any error of fact or law. Accordingly, we deny Petitioner’s request. This is a final action by the Board and no further reconsideration requests will be accepted.3

Attachments:

DAB No. 3171 dated February 4, 2025
USPS tracking receipt

ATTACHMENT 1

Department of Health and Human Services
DEPARTMENTAL APPEALS BOARD
Appellate Division

Ingrid Gordon-Patterson
Docket No. A-25-13
Decision No. 3171
February 4, 2025

DETERMINATION TO DECLINE REVIEW OF
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION

After reviewing the record to evaluate the issues presented by Petitioner in her appeal of the administrative law judge (ALJ) Dismissal in Ingrid Gordon-Patterson, CRD Docket No. C-23-705, Ruling No. 2025-4 (Nov. 12, 2024), we have determined that we need not render a separate decision. The ALJ dismissed Petitioner’s hearing request under 42 C.F.R. § 1005.2(e)(1) because it was not timely filed and Petitioner failed to make a “reasonable showing” to rebut the presumption of receipt of the June 30, 2017 Inspector General (IG) exclusion notice five days after the date of the notice. Dismissal at 2-3; Cf. Kenneth Schrager, DAB No. 2366, at 4-5 (2011) (holding petitioner’s mere statement denying receipt of exclusion notice, without “sufficient explanation and corroborating evidence,” is insufficient to rebut presumption of receipt under 42 C.F.R. § 1005.2(c)).

On appeal, Petitioner raises no exceptions that were not already sufficiently addressed by the ALJ or prior Board decisions. Petitioner states that “[a]s an inmate, I did not have guaranteed access to mail or legal correspondence” and “was not informed of the federal exclusion at the time of its issuance and thus was unable to appeal within the required timeframe.” Notice of Appeal (NA) at 3. These are the same arguments Petitioner presented before the ALJ, and, as the ALJ found, “Petitioner provides no other context or explanation, or evidence that supports her assertion” nor has Petitioner even included “a sworn declaration attesting to the statements in her filing, despite being specifically instructed to do so.” Dismissal at 2-3. Petitioner provides numerous case law citations that purportedly support her assertion that she did not receive “due process” or “actual notice,” but Petitioner presents no evidence that rebuts the presumption of receipt, or the evidence submitted by the IG. NA at 3-5, 7-8. Likewise, Petitioner asserts that the ALJ “failed to adequately evaluate the evidence and mitigating factors, leading to an erroneous decision unsupported by law” and the Dismissal “lacked a reasoned explanation and failed to assess the facts adequately, making the decision arbitrary,” but provides only a string of case law citations with no specific argument or explanation that refutes the ALJ’s findings and decision based on the record evidence. NA at 6-8. Thus, Petitioner has not presented any argument or evidence supporting her assertion that the ALJ Dismissal was legally erroneous or unsupported by substantial evidence on the

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whole record, 42 C.F.R. § 1005.21(h), nor any argument or evidence that rebuts the “well-recognized principle that it is both reasonable and legally sound for parties in litigation to consider certain legal documents sent through a regular mail system and in the course of litigation to have been received by a date certain.” Dismissal at 3 (citing Schrager at 4).

Petitioner also asserts that the “exclusion imposes an excessive burden, preventing [her] from contributing to the healthcare field and serving vulnerable populations”; that she has demonstrated a “commitment to rehabilitation and civic engagement,” as her “efforts post-incarceration, including professional training and community service, demonstrate [her] readiness to reenter the workforce responsibly and effectively”; and that the doctrine of “equitable tolling” should be applied. RR at 3-5. First, Petitioner failed to specifically raise an argument that “equitable tolling” should apply before the ALJ; thus, this issue is not properly before the Board. See 42 C.F.R. § 1005.21(e) (“The [Board] will not consider . . . any issue in the briefs that could have been raised before the ALJ but was not.”); see also Sonny Austin Ramdeo, DAB No. 3152, at 1 (2024) (declining review for Petitioner’s failure to raise equitable tolling argument before the ALJ “for that reason alone”). Second, the “regulations do not permit an ALJ or the Board to excuse a petitioner’s failure to meet the regulatory filing requirements based on equitable grounds.” Ramdeo at 2 (citing Schrager at 6); see also Boris Sachakov, M.D., DAB No. 2707, at 4 (2016) (holding that 42 C.F.R. § 1005.2(e)(1) mandates dismissal of an untimely hearing request); Gary Grossman, DAB No. 2267, at 5 (2009) (“[T]he ALJ was required to dismiss Petitioner’s hearing request if it was not timely filed.”).

Pursuant to 42 C.F.R. § 1005.21(g), we therefore decline review of and summarily affirm the ALJ’s Dismissal.

/s/

Michael Cunningham

/s/

Christopher S. Randolph

/s/

Karen E. Mayberry

Presiding Board Member