Arkansas Department of Human Services, DAB No. 1273 (1991)

Department of Health and Human Services

DEPARTMENTAL APPEALS BOARD

Appellate Division

SUBJECT: Arkansas Department of Human Services

DATE:  August 22, 1991
Docket No. 90-119
Decision No. 1273

DECISION

The Arkansas Department of Human Services (State) appealed a
determination by the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA)
disallowing federal financial participation (FFP) claimed by Arkansas
under Title XIX of the Social Security Act (Act) for drugs provided to
Medicaid recipients from April 1 through July 31, 1989.  The State had
paid for the drugs based on use of the "average wholesale price" (AWP)
plus the dispensing fee established by the Medicaid State Plan in effect
during the disallowance period ($4.01).  During Board proceedings, HCFA
agreed to reduce the disallowance amount to $589,382.  Essentially,
HCFA's current position is that the AWP minus 10.5% of the AWP, plus the
$4.01 dispensing fee, acts as an aggregate limit on the drug payments.

The State first argued that application of the AWP minus 10.5% to the
period in question here was reasonable only if the increased dispensing
fee adopted in a later amendment to the State Medicaid Plan is also
applied.  When HCFA responded that it was required to apply the $4.01
dispensing fee, the State asserted, as it had previously, that the AWP
represented the State's "best estimate of the price generally and
currently paid for those drugs," as required by the Medicaid
regulations.  The State requested, and received, an opportunity for an
evidentiary hearing to provide testimony the State said would show that
the AWP constituted its "best estimate" during the disallowance period.

For the reasons stated below, we conclude that the State could not
reasonably consider the AWP to be its "best estimate" since the State
was aware that pharmacists .generally paid less than that amount and
since the State had no pertinent records to support a determination that
the AWP represented the price generally and currently paid.  We further
conclude, however, that HCFA should reconsider its position on how to
calculate the amount that should be disallowed as a result of the
State's failure to timely develop a supportable estimate.  Thus, we
uphold the disallowance in principle, but remand to HCFA to reconsider
the disallowance amount, in light of the factors outlined below.

I. Background

 A.  Requirements for drug payments

Section 1902(a)(30)(A) of the Social Security Act requires Medicaid
state plans to provide methods and procedures "to assure that payments
are consistent with efficiency, economy, and quality of care."  Rules
published in July 1987, and in effect throughout the period involved
here, control payments for drugs under Medicaid.  42 C.F.R 447.331 -
447.334.  For some drugs, HCFA lists specific payment limits.  For
unlisted drugs and certain others, all called "other drugs," a state's
payments --

 . . . must not exceed in the aggregate, payment levels that the
 [state] agency has determined by applying the lower of the --
  (1)  Estimated acquisition costs plus reasonable
  dispensing fees established by the [state] agency; or
  (2)  Providers' usual and customary charges to the
  general public.

42 C.F.R. 447.331(b).

The "estimated acquisition cost" (EAC) is defined in 42 C.F.R. 447.301
as the state's "best estimate of the price generally and currently paid"
by providers for a drug.

The Medicaid regulations further require each state to make findings and
assurances, in its state plan, that its Medicaid expenditures for all
other drugs, in the aggregate, are in accordance with 42 C.F.R. 447.331,
and to maintain "data, mathematical or statistical computations,
comparisons and any other pertinent records to support its findings and
assurances."  42 C.F.R. 447.333.

.       B.  Drug pricing generally

There is a history of concern in the Medicaid program about controlling
costs of drugs.  One problem was states' use of the "average wholesale
price" (AWP) of drugs as a measure of acquisition cost.  The "wholesale"
element could be quite misleading, because there were sales promotions,
allowances and discounts which reduced the actual prices pharmacists
paid below the AWP.

In the mid-1970's, HCFA had proposed to limit payment to actual
acquisition costs, apparently to counter the practice of using the AWP
in national drug pricing publications.  Determining actual costs was
burdensome, however, and the agency ultimately decided to specify use of
estimated costs in its regulations (but HCFA explained in the preamble
that it was specifically rejecting the suggested use of the AWP, on the
basis that it frequently produced an inflated figure).  40 Fed. Reg
34518 (1975).  The estimate made by the state agency was to be
consistent with "any drug price information furnished the program agency
by the Department [HHS]."  45 C.F.R. 19.3(b) (1975).

An audit conducted in 1983 by the HHS Office of the Inspector General
(OIG) in six states (including Arkansas) found that pharmacists' drug
costs averaged about 16% below the AWP, and that in only 14 of 3,469
purchases examined did providers pay the AWP or higher (and then for
extenuating reasons).  HCFA Exhibit (Ex.) F, p. 4.

The current rules were adopted effective October 29, 1987; among the
changes, the rules applied limits on an aggregate rather than a
drug-specific basis.  One purpose of this change was to give some
flexibility to states to establish reimbursement methods.  In discussing
the requirements for findings and assurances and related recordkeeping,
however, the preamble to the rule indicated that HCFA expected the
states "to determine the estimated acquisition costs before making
comparisons on the aggregate basis."  52 Fed. Reg. 28648, 28654 (July
31, 1987).

 C.  The Arkansas State Plan and proposed amendments

The Arkansas State Plan provision on drug payments which was in effect
during the disallowance period (and was effective January 1, 1987)
states that the State will pay the lower of the provider's usual and
customary charge or .the "cost of the drug plus a $4.01 dispensing fee."
HCFA Ex. A.  In practice, the State was paying the AWP plus the
dispensing fee (if this total was lower than the usual and customary
charge). 1/

On February 11, 1988, the State submitted an amendment to its State Plan
(Transmittal No. 88-05) which would have defined estimated acquisition
cost to be the AWP.  HCFA asked for clarifying information in a letter
dated April 12, 1988, citing to various studies as evidence that "use of
the AWP is not the State's best estimate . . . ."  HCFA Ex. H.

In a response received June 22, 1988, the Director of the State's
Division of Economic and Medical Services explained why the State
considered the available information on drug prices to be outdated,
inconsistent, arbitrary, and statistically incomplete.  He expressed
concern, however, that "AWP is an artificially high basis for
reimbursement."  HCFA Ex. G, p. 5.  He said the State was entering into
a bidding process for a pricing survey to determine the actual
acquisition price and to modify the reimbursement structure accordingly.
Id.

HCFA notified the State by letter dated September 20, 1988, that it was
disapproving State Plan Transmittal No. 88-05, on the basis that AWP
could not qualify as the State's best estimate under the regulation. 2/
After .receiving this notice, the State issued an invitation for bids
for a survey and, on December 3, 1988, entered into a contract with the
accounting firm of Myers and Stauffer to conduct a survey of Arkansas
retail drug prices and of dispensing costs incurred by pharmacies.  Tr.,
pp. 61-62; 141-142.

HCFA advised the State, in a letter dated February 8, 1989, that, if the
State had not implemented an acceptable plan amendment by April 1, 1989,
HCFA would begin to defer the federal share of prescribed drug
expenditures.  The State responded in a letter dated February 17, 1989,
informing HCFA that it had contracted with Myers and Stauffer to conduct
a survey and that the State expected to receive the results by May 31,
1989 and to implement an EAC at "this time."  State Ex. D.

In a letter dated March 31, 1989, HCFA stated:

     Your expenditure report for the period April 1 through June 30 is
     due in August and our actions at that time will depend on the
     actions which have been taken by the State.  As pointed out in your
     letter, you should have the results of the survey by May 31 which
     is well in advance of your expenditure report due date.  If you
     take immediate action to base your drug ingredient cost estimate on
     verifiable data from that survey and put an approvable methodology
     in place during the April-June quarter, we will not include in our
     review expenditures made before the date the methodology is in
     place.

State Ex. E.

The State encountered some delays in obtaining the survey results
(discussed below), and did not receive the survey report until about
June 14, 1989.  Tr., pp. 69, 141-142.  The report (which was 60 pages
plus attachments) found that the average discount from AWP in Arkansas
was 13%.  HCFA Ex. B.  The State sought some clarifications from Myers
and Stauffer, held meetings to discuss the survey results, developed a
state plan proposal and received internal approval for it, and submitted
the proposal to HCFA on July 21, 1989.  Tr., pp. 23, 69-74.  The
proposed plan amendment, Transmittal No. (TN) 89-24, would
have.established the EAC at AWP minus 7% and raised the dispensing fee
to $4.39 plus .095(EAC).  State Ex. F. 3/

After engaging in discussions with HCFA, the State submitted a revised
version of plan amendment TN 89-4, which defined the EAC as AWP minus
10.5% and set a dispensing fee of $4.16 plus .093(EAC).  State Ex. H.
HCFA approved the revision in July, 1990, with an effective date of
August 1, 1989.  State Ex. G. 4/

Meanwhile, HCFA had issued this disallowance on May 2, 1990, calculating
the disallowance amount using AWP minus 13%.  Based on the revised plan
amendment, HCFA reduced the disallowance amount (and also settled a
related disallowance for a later period).

II.  The parties' arguments

The State argued that it has always been considered the role of the
State to determine how it would arrive at the best estimate of the cost
of the drug.  The State asserted that, up until a few years ago, 20
states had used AWP.  The State acknowledged that since that time there
has been a move to become more accurate about the "real cost" of drugs.
Tr., p. 10.  The State said, however, that it had been actively engaged
since 1987 in assessing what is the best estimate, but that there was no
scientific study to assess the costs in Arkansas until the Myers and
Stauffer study was completed in June 1989.  The State argued that it was
generally accepted and recognized nationwide that the AWP should be used
"until such time as there was objective scientific information .to the
contrary."  Tr., p. 12.  The State asserted that, once it had such
information, it had acted promptly to evaluate that information, to
propose a plan amendment, and to implement the proposed amendment.  The
State argued that it had the burden only to develop what it considered
to be the best estimate and that it had met that burden.

The State also argued that it did not have notice until HCFA rejected
that plan amendment specifying AWP in September 1988 that HCFA would not
consider an undiscounted AWP to be consistent with the regulatory
requirement.  The State said that it had informed HCFA of the delays in
the survey process, arguing that even with the delays, the survey was
completed in less time than such surveys normally take.

HCFA argued that the State's payment of the AWP did not comply either
with the regulation or with the State Plan.  HCFA said that the State
should have known it could not pay AWP, in light of the OIG report
(which State officials acknowledged having seen) and of the statements
about the AWP HCFA had made.  HCFA also cited the statement in the April
12, 1988 letter from HCFA that "use of an unmodified AWP would make the
amendment violate Section 1902(a)(30) of the Act and implementing
regulations at 42 C.F.R. 447.200."  HCFA Ex. H.  HCFA argued that,
although none of the various drug price surveys and pricing data were
conclusive for Arkansas, "they collectively show a persuasive pattern
that AWP is not the actual selling price of drugs anywhere such surveys
were conducted."  HCFA post-hearing brief, p. 8.  HCFA argued that the
State was unreasonable in delaying until September 1988 to commence a
process to determine drug prices in Arkansas.

HCFA further argued that it had acted reasonably in quantifying the
disallowance by applying the AWP minus 10.5% since the State had not
properly quantified what price was being paid for the drugs and since
the AWP minus 10.5% was the amount ultimately agreed to based on the
survey data, which was from 1988.

Below, we first address the question of whether the AWP qualified as the
State's "best estimate of the price generally and currently paid" during
the disallowance period.  We then address whether HCFA reasonably
calculated the amount of unallowable costs incurred as a result of the
State's use of the AWP.

.III.  Analysis

The key issue here is whether the AWP can reasonably be considered the
State's best estimate during the period in question here.  While the
State's evidence demonstrates the difficulties of determining a best
estimate, the State's evidence ultimately does not support the State's
use of the AWP.

The regulations clearly required that the State use its best estimate of
the amount generally and currently paid.  The regulations contemplated
an effort by the State to determine this amount in some reasonable
manner which could be documented.  As this Board said in Oklahoma Dept.
of Human Services, DAB No. 1271 (1991), p. 8, developing a "best
estimate" of an EAC clearly requires at least some minimal assessment
and determination of actual drug costing practices.  Moreover, the State
was subject to the general requirement in section 1902(a)(30)(A) that
its payment methods be consistent with economy.  In spite of this
obligation, the State had absolutely no data to support use of the AWP.
See Tr., pp. 63, 91.  What the State's evidence did show is as follows.

The unrebutted testimony presented by the State at the hearing shows
that the inappropriateness of using the AWP was not as clear from the
State's viewpoint in the mid-1980's, as HCFA asserted it should be.
Other states were using the AWP, and the AWP compendia were readily
available, with weekly updates which could be loaded onto the State's
computerized claims processing system.  Tr., pp. 22, 49.  The OIG report
was not based on a valid statistical sample, and thus did not provide a
reliable basis for determining how much the AWP was being discounted in
Arkansas.  Tr., pp. 49-50, 65.

The testimony further shows that the State encountered administrative
difficulties in the process of contracting for a reliable survey and
obtaining and evaluating the survey results.  The invitation for bid had
to be approved by HCFA, and the State had to follow its contracting
procedures.  Tr., p. 90.  Delays were caused through the need to obtain
information from the State's fiscal agent.  Tr., pp. 24-25, 66.
Moreover, the State had to rely on the pharmacists to respond to the
survey.  Tr., p. 24.  The task of analyzing the data was apparently
enormous, but Myers and Stauffer nonetheless completed the survey in
less time than it took for similar surveys in other states.  Tr., pp.
146-148.  .The testimony also shows that the question of determining
what discount percentage should be applied is not as simple as HCFA's
arguments suggested.  The amount of the discount given varies
considerably (for example, chain pharmacies might obtain a larger
discount than independent pharmacies).  Tr., pp. 123, 152; HCFA Ex. B,
Appendix, p. A-67.  This raises an issue of how a state can set a
discount which will ensure accessibility to services for Medicaid
recipients and avoid legal battles over its reimbursement to providers.
Tr., pp. 70-71.  This was a legitimate concern for the State since a
survey by the Arkansas College of Pharmacy had shown that, if the State
were to set the reimbursement level too low, many pharmacists would drop
out of the Medicaid program.  Tr., p. 125; see also Tr., p. 71.  Also,
undisputed testimony shows that the "discounts" which the wholesalers
were giving to the providers were not all cash discounts.  Rather, in
some instances the wholesalers were simply shifting costs which had
previously been included in the drug prices to appear as a separate
charge on the sales invoices.  These costs included charges for items or
services such as labels, bottles, and computer ordering services.  Tr.,
pp. 117-121.

This evidence is an insufficient basis for the State to prevail here,
however.  First, as discussed above, the State did not have any data to
support use of the AWP, as required.  Second, while the testimony shows
that the State also did not have the data to support a determination of
the exact amount of the discounted prices being paid in Arkansas, the
evidence shows that the State could not reasonably think that the full
amount of the AWP was being paid generally. 5/  The OIG audit certainly
was reliable at least in concluding that the AWP was not being paid.
The State Director acknowledged that he knew of the OIG audit in 1986
and was on notice through it of the discrepancy between AWP and the
actual price paid.  Tr., p. 56.  The Director of the Division of
Economic and Medical Services acknowledged that, based on the OIG audit,
HCFA had encouraged the State to look at setting some rate of
reimbursement less than AWP.  Tr., p. 64.

.Moreover, the State's explanations of its delay in obtaining reliable
data do not justify the initial delay caused through the State proposing
in 1988 a plan amendment specifying AWP, nor do they justify the full
time period it took to obtain and act on the survey results.  One State
witness speculated that the State did not act sooner to commission a
survey because HCFA was considering a new regulation discounting AWP by
10% and because a lawsuit had been filed by pharmacists who challenged
HCFA's position.  Tr., pp. 101-102.  The record shows, however, that he
was referring to the regulatory process which was concluded in 1987 and
that the lawsuit was concluded in 1985.  See, e.g., HCFA post-hearing
brief, attachment.  Thus, this does not explain why the State acted in
early 1988 to propose a plan amendment specifying AWP, rather than to
obtain reliable data on the prices generally and currently paid.

The record shows that the State was not justified in waiting to begin
the process of contracting for a survey until after the State received
formal disapproval of the plan amendment specifying AWP, in September
1988.  The State's own letter sent to HCFA in June 1988 shows that the
State was aware of the need for a survey at least as of that date and
had assured HCFA it would act expeditiously to commission a survey.
HCFA Ex. G, p. 5.  The State's testimony about the need to follow
contracting procedures was vague and neither specifically nor fully
accounts for the three months between the June letter and the time the
IFB was issued in September.  Tr., p. 90.  Moreover, we do not see how
the State could have reasonably thought that HCFA might approve the AWP
as EAC, given HCFA's April response and the history of HCFA's position
on AWP.

The State also did not provide any explanation of why it took as long as
it did after receiving the proposals to actually award the contract.
The witness from Myers and Stauffer said that they predicted a report
date of April 1989 based on an assumption that the award date would be
only two weeks or so after they mailed the IFB back, but, instead, a
little over a month elapsed.  Tr., pp. 144-145.  Like this delay, some
of the delays once the contract was awarded, such as obtaining needed
computer lists from the fiscal agent, would appear to be ultimately the
State's responsibility.  See Tr., pp. 24-25, 145.  While these delays
were not lengthy, they contributed to the State's failure to meet the
deadline HCFA announced in its March 31, 1989 letter.

.Finally, we conclude that the State could not reasonably have relied on
the mere fact that it informed HCFA about the delays in obtaining the
results of the survey as a basis for thinking that HCFA would extend the
deadline announced in HCFA's March 31, 1989 letter.  The State did not
allege that HCFA had specifically agreed to extend the deadline.  See
Tr., pp. 51-52, 68.  At most, the HCFA letter can be viewed as a
conditional agreement to waive a disallowance.  The State's failure to
meet the condition in the letter by submitting a plan amendment based on
the survey by the end of the quarter specified means that the State
could not reasonably expect HCFA to refrain from a disallowance solely
based on HCFA's silence.  While State officials indicated that they may
not have understood that payments as of April 1, 1989 would be
disallowed if the State did not act by the date specified in the letter,
their understanding is irrelevant; the March 31, 1989 letter gave clear
notice of HCFA's intention.

In sum, we conclude that the State could not reasonably consider the AWP
to be its "best estimate of the amount generally and currently paid;"
that the State had constructive notice in 1987 that it needed data to
support such an estimate; and that the State actually knew that a survey
was needed at least by June 1988.  We further conclude that HCFA was
reasonable in setting a deadline for the State and in imposing a
disallowance when the State failed to meet that deadline.

On the other hand, the record establishes that, in determining the
disallowance amount, HCFA applied the AWP minus 10.5%, without
considering the other changes in the reimbursement method HCFA agreed
to.  If the State had implemented its new reimbursement methods so they
were effective during the disallowance period (as HCFA said the State
should have), the amount the State would have paid would have differed
from the amount the State did pay (using AWP) by an amount less than the
disallowance amount HCFA calculated.  The increase in the dispensing fee
would also have been reflected in the State's claims, since this was
part of the amendment agreed to.  See State Ex. G.

We think that HCFA should reconsider its position on how to calculate
the disallowance amount, in light of the testimony presented at the
hearing and the other considerations we outline below.

HCFA indicated that it could not approve the new State plan provision
retroactive to April 1, 1989 because the State had not implemented the
provision until August 1,.1989.  HCFA thus thought that it was precluded
from using any dispensing fee other than the $4.01 fee specified in the
existing State plan.

While certain state plan provisions may not be effective until
implemented, regulations which HCFA published in 1988 permit a plan
amendment such as this one to be effective on "a date requested by the
State if HCFA approves it."  42 C.F.R. 430.20(b)(2) (1988).  HCFA's own
witness said that HCFA had expected the State to apply an amendment
based on the survey back to April 1, 1989, by retroactively adjusting
the provider payments.  Tr., p. 183.  The State's rationale for not
doing so was that it had to give timely notice to the providers.  See
Tr., p. 67.  If HCFA is correct that the payments (at least for FFP
purposes) could be adjusted retroactively, then we see no reason for
denying the State's request for an April 1, 1989 effective date for the
plan amendment.

Even if HCFA would not grant this approval, however, it is not clear why
HCFA applied part of the new methodology, but not all of it.  The
regulations on which HCFA relied for the disallowance establish
aggregate upper limits on what the State can pay.  The regulations use
as that aggregate upper limit the lower of EAC "plus reasonable
dispensing fees" or usual and customary charges.  Although the State may
have actually paid only $4.01 as a dispensing fee, the State's survey
(which as HCFA pointed out was based on 1988 costs) establishes that the
amount of a reasonable dispensing fee for this period was the higher
figure HCFA ultimately agreed to.

Moreover, HCFA viewed the term "cost" in the existing plan as
"ingredient cost," entirely separate from the dispensing fee.  The plan
merely says "cost," however, and the State's testimony showed that the
wholesalers had been including as drug costs some items that more
properly should have been considered part of the dispensing fee.  See
Tr., pp. 49-50.  The State's testimony shows that, if the State had not
increased the dispensing fee at the same time as discounting from the
AWP, the State would have had to discount by a lesser percentage than
10.5 in order to assure access to services, particularly for recipients
in rural areas.  As the State pointed out, it must not only consider
efficiency and economy in setting reimbursement rates in accordance with
section 1902(a)(30)(A) of the Act, but must also consider quality of
care.

.HCFA's position was essentially that the State was required under the
regulations to have implemented a new reimbursement system at least by
the beginning of the disallowance period (April 1, 1989). 6/  Thus, we
conclude that HCFA should consider determining the disallowance amount
by calculating the difference between what the State did pay and what
the State would have paid if it had implemented the new system by April
1, 1989 (including application of the usual and customary charge limit).

Conclusion

We uphold the disallowance in principle, but remand to HCFA to
reconsider how to calculate the disallowance amount.  If the State
disagrees with HCFA's recalculations, it may return to the Board on that
limited issue, within 30 days after receiving notice of HCFA's
recalculations.

 


     _____________________________
     Donald F. Garrett

 


     _____________________________
     Norval D. (John) Settle

 


     _____________________________
     Judith A. Ballard Presiding
     Board Member .1.    At the
hearing, HCFA indicated that it was in the process of calculating a
reduction in the disallowance amount to reflect the fact that the State
had not paid the AWP plus dispensing fee where this total was greater
than the usual and customary charge.  Transcript of hearing (Tr.), p.
17.  We assume that the $589,382 figure used in HCFA's post-hearing
brief reflects this reduction, or, if it does not, HCFA will make this
adjustment, as agreed.

2.    The State requested a hearing on the plan approval, but the
administrative law judge appointed as the hearing officer stayed the
case pending appeal of the related disallowance.  We note that a court
has held that HCFA may properly deny a Medicaid state plan amendment
which proposes to set a state's EAC at AWP in the absence of a showing
that AWP is in fact that state's "best estimate" of the price generally
and currently paid.  Louisiana v. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human
Services, 905 F.2d 877 (5th Cir. 1990).

3.    The State presented testimony explaining why it had not adopted
the average discount from the AWP (13%) reported in the survey report.
Essentially, the State was concerned that since about 30% of the
pharmacies were paying more than the average amount, these pharmacies
would drop out of the program if the average discount were adopted as
the EAC and that this would reduce accessibility of services.  See  Tr.,
pp. 33-35, 70; HCFA Ex. B, Appendix, p. A-67.

4.    HCFA first said that it chose this effective date because this was
the date the State requested in its transmittal.  When the State asked
if HCFA could nonetheless make the amendment retroactive HCFA declined,
apparently on the basis that the State had not implemented the amendment
until August 1, 1989.  See our discussion of this below.

5.    Indeed, even the Arkansas Pharmacy Association representative said
that nearly all pharmacies were receiving at least a 2% cash discount.
Tr., p. 139.

6.    Thus, this case is distinguishable from the situation where a
state is making an optional change in its reimbursement system in order
to enhance federal funding and seeks to make that change retroactive,
without following plan amendment