Utah Department of Social Services, DAB No. 892 (1987)

.ÌÌ..Ì  DEPARTMENTAL GRANT APPEALS BOARD

Department ofHealth and Human Services

SUBJECT:  Utah Department of Social Services

Docket No. 87©1
Decision No. 892

DATE:  August 28, 1987

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The Office of Child Support Enforcement (OCSE) disallowed $18,862which
the Utah Department of Social Services (Utah) claimed underTitle IV©D of
the Social Security Act (Child Support andEstablishment of Paternity)
for the quarter which ended December31, 1983.  The disallowance was
based on OCSE's finding that thisamount represented the federal share of
interest earned onundistributed child support collections.

This case followed an earlier Board decision involving a Utahappeal in
which we held that OCSE was authorized to treat thiskind of interest as
income for which states are accountable. Decision No. 750 ("”Utah I•"),
pp. 1©7. ## While we upheld OCSE inprinciple, we found that there were
reasons to question theamount of the disallowance, and we remanded the
case to OCSE toprovide Utah with an opportunity to show that the actual
amountof interest earned was less than OCSE had said.  After
furtherreview, OCSE reduced the disallowance from the original $42,793to
the $18,862 involved here.  Utah, however, continued todispute the
amount of the disallowance, and returned to theBoard.  Utah proposed an
alternative methodology which would setthe disallowance amount at less
than half OCSE's figure. Although the amount in issue here is not
substantial, there arepotential disallowances for other quarters which
could beaffected by resolution of this dispute.

”                    •

 In subsequent decisions concerning appeals from two otherstates,
 we confirmed OCSE's right to the federal share of suchinterest,
 after considering further argument on the matter.  ”See•Indiana
 Department of Public Welfare, Decision No. 859, April 13,1987;
 New York State Department of Social Services, Decision No.794,
 September 30, 1986.  Nothing in this decision should beviewed as
 modifying our conclusions in those cases.

The sole issue in this case concerns the calculation of thedisallowance
amount for the quarter in question.  After carefullyco#sidering the
evidence and argument presented in this case andthe earlier case, we
have concluded that the amount of interestcalculated by OCSE is
unreasonable.  As discussed below, it isclear that some amount of
interest should be disallowed, and thatOCSE should establish a
reasonable figure; one approach would beÜj

”Background:  the calculation issue in the earli#r case•.

In ”Utah I•, OCSE had computed the amount of the interest by usingdata
from a quarterly report regularly submitted by Utahprimaril# to show
expenditures under Title IV©A (Aid to Familieswith Dependent Children or
AFDC).  This AFDC expenditure reportalso was the way Utah showed a
reduction in state IV©Aexpenditures by the net federal share of IV©D
supportcollections.  OCSE established the amounts Utah reported
asdeposits of child support collections (not in dispute), andcomputed
the interest on those deposits, with certain undisputedadjustments, from
the date of deposit until the date that OCSE”received the report•.  Utah
alleged that most of the collectedfunds were already distributed (and
thus no longer earninginterest) by the time OCSE received the report.
We found thatsome amount of interest was earned on child support
collectionsdeposited in Utah's treasury, although precisely how much
wasunclear.  Decision No. 750, pp. 7©8.  While we recognized thatUtah
helped creat# the difficulty in calculating interest by itspractice of
commingling support collections with other funds, wealso found OCSE's
use of the report receipt date questionableenough to justify giving Utah
an opportunity to rebut HCFA'scomputation by producing evidence to prove
it actually had earnedless interest.  Thus, we remanded the case.

The parties now have returned to the Board with substantiallymodified
approaches and more sophisticated analyses of thecalculation issue
(their efforts in the earlier case focusedpredominantly on the
substantive issue of whether interest had tobe repaid).

”OCSE's revised policy and disallowance•.

In a June, 1986 memorandum, while this case was remanded, OCSEchanged
its approach to interest calculation.  The

memorandum ("PIQ©86©1"), issued by OCSE's Deputy Director toOCSE's
Regional Representative in New York (with copies sent toall other
regions) appears prospectively to require a state toreport ”actual•
interest and to ". . . distinguish interest earnedon IV©D collections
from interest earned on other funds." Utah'sAppeal File, Doc. 1.  The
memorandum further stated that ". . .where interest was not reported for
periods prior to the date ofthis memorandum, interest ”may• be
calculated from the date thecollection is deposited . . . to the end of
the quarter for whichthe collection is reported. . . ." ”Id•.  (emphasis
added).  OCSEsaid it basically applied the methodology in PIQ©86©1
toestablish the amount of the reduced disallowance (OCSE's Brief,p. 3),
but, as discussed below# there is more #o its method thanthat.  Üj

A.  ”Context•.

We are dealing with a factual determination colored by context. While
not decisive ”per• ”se•, the following two elements provide animportant
backdrop for the discussion which follows thereafter:

 1.Ì .ÌAs we have indicated before, OCSE policy on calculationof
interest has been murky, and appears to have beenmade an enforcement
priority only relatively recently. ”Utah I•, pp. 9©11; ”New York•, p.
13.  Also, the Statepresented unrebutted testimony to the effect
thatdespite many federal audits over past years, andprobably awareness
on the part of federal authoritiesthat Utah's funds were commingled, no
questions wereraised about interest earnings until recently. Transcript
of hearing held June 3, 1987 (TR), pp. 23ª25.  In June, 1986, in
PIQ©86©1, OCSE substantiallychanged its policy on interest calculation
and yet, asthis dispute indicates, issues remain.  None of thismitigates
Utah's obligation in principle to account forinterest earned on Title
IV©D funds, but this contextcannot, in fairness, be ignored in assessing
thereasonableness of Utah's methods of achievingÞ.JÞ

Ì .ÌÌ..Ìcompliance with OCSE requirements and with the burdenwe
articulated in ”Utah I•. ##Þ.JÞ

 2.  We reaffirm our earlier conclusions that ”  •

Ì .ÌÌ..Ì"AFDC and Title IV©D are quite separate programs, interms of
their federal oversight, their operation, andtheir appropriations
structure.  . . . nothing in thelaw . . . authorizes OCSE to ignore the
requirements inTitle IV©D because of a cash flow problem in Title IVªA.
. . ." ”Utah I•, p. 5.Þ.JÞ

Ì .ÌAlthough we stand by that analysis, it is nevertheless truethat
Titles IV©A and IV©D are unusually interconnectedprograms in.ways
obvious enough that we need not detail themhere.  ”See•, ”e.g.•, ”Utah
I•, pp. 3©5; ”New York•, pp.  8©12. While Titles IV©A and IV©D are
separate, they are not sounrelated that evidence about Title IV©A must
be completelyignored in calculating IV©D distributions.  In part,
thedisallowance depends on OCSE's insistence that it would notconsider a
Title IV©A warrant as evidence of cessation ofinterest simply ". . .
because it is a 4©A warrant, not a 4ªD warrant." TR, p. 88.  When
examining the reasonableness ofUtah's methods of achieving compliance
with OCSErequirements and the burden set out in ”Utah I•,
theinterrelationships of Titles IV©A and IV©D are a backgroundfactor
that cannot fairly be dismissed, notwithstanding thatthe obligation in
principle to repay interest on IV©DÜj

 

 

”                    •

 The record indicates that as of July 1, 1986, OCSE and Utahhad
 agreed on a change in Utah's accounting system whicheffectively
 calculates and transfers the federal share of IV©Dfunds daily
 and eliminates interest altogether.  Utah's Brief, p.3; OCSE's
 Brief, p. 8; TR, pp. 20©22.

b.  ”Reasonableness of OCSE's approach•.

In ”Utah I•, we recognized OCSE's need for an administra¬tivelyexpedient
way of calculating IV©D interest in instances where astate had failed to
do a good job.  OCSE originally calculatedinterest from the date of
deposit of collections (an undisputedstarting point) to a "date of
distribution" which was the datethe federal office received the
quarterly report.  ”Utah I•, p. 8. We found that this practice was
questionable.  ”Id•., pp. 9©11.  Inresponse, OCSE revised its
calculation of the disallowance in twosignificant ways:  by changing the
date through which interestwas deemed to be earned to the end of the
quarter, and by using azero balance as an opening figure for
calculations for thequarter.

For the following reasons, we conclude that these actions do notmake
OCSE's disallowance approach less question¬able, and, infact, may
unintentionally have made OCSE's methodology appearmore arbitrary than
before.

OCSE revised its policy in PIQ©86©1, issued June 10, 1986. Utah's Appeal
File, Document 1.  This memorandum stated inpertinent part:

Ì .ÌTotal interest income earned on IV©D collections at theState or
local level during each quarter must be reported online 3 of Form
OCSE©41 to reduce IV©D expenditures for thequarter.  This would require
States to be able todistinguish interest earned on IV©D collections
frominterest earned on other funds.  In those instances whereinterest
was not reported for periods prior to the date ofthis memorandum,
interest may be calculated from the datethe collection is deposited in
an interest©bearing accountat the State or local level to the end of the
quarter forÜj

Our concern here is with the last sentence, which allegedly formsthe
basis for OCSE's methodology.  On its face, it is notnecessarily
unreasonable for OCSE to assess interest to the endof the quarter when a
state does not or cannot show it earnedless interest.  However, in the
present case, Utah ”had• some suchevidence (discussed below), and the
record here contains evidencethat OCSE personnel specifically refused to
examine Utah'sdocumentation on the basis that PIQ©86©1 established
thedistribution date.  TR, pp. 76©7, 99.  Thus, in this case,

the end©of©quarter distribution basis was used as a ”per•
”se•determinant of interest, just as formerly the date of receipt ofthe
expenditure report was in ”Utah I•.  If the former policyrisked being
viewed as arbitrary, then the new policy suffersvirtually the same risk;
there is little difference in fiscalimpact, and no difference in
principle, between rigidly using theend of the quarter and rigidly using
a point some days later. Also, the policy explicitly says that the end
of the quarter"may" be used, which implies some choice (and a
correspondingduty to exercise discretion), not a rule of rigid
application. The policy in the first and second sentences quoted
above©©whichgives a state an opportunity to show actual interest
earned©ªappears to frame the substantive policy which is actually
(andlegitimately) the focus of the Agency's concern ©© ”i.e.•, that
astate bear a burden of proving the amount of interest earned. ”3•/

As stated, another factor in OCSE's reduction of the
originaldisallowance was the use of a zero opening balance.  In ”Utah
I•,OCSE had used a substantial balance of funds drawn from a
priorquarterly report as the opening balance used as a starting pointfor
calculation of interest during the quarter in question.  ”UtahI•, p. 8.
In the revised disallowance, OCSE used zero as theopening balance, thus
calculating interest only on thecollections during the quarter.  TR, pp.
15, 80, 91©2.  Thisclearly was favorable to the State (as it reduced the
interestamount) and apparently was done in good faith. ##
Nevertheless,we cannot ignore the questions raised by this precipitous
changein calculation methodology.  It ”                    •

## Since the policy in PIQ©86©1 for prior periods isd#scretionary, we
need not consider whether a mandatory policycould be imposed
retroactively on the states.

 OCSE said that it took this approach because it perceivedthat
 the Board had a "concern" in ”Utah I• about use of the
 openingbalance.  TR, p. 83.  However, our concern was a more
 generalizedone, and there is nothing in ”Utah I• that suggested
 OCSE should dowhat it did here.  Elsewhere, there are
 suggestions that the zeroopening balance was used as a rough
 justification for not lookingat Utah's documentation, and that
 it might represent an aspect ofÜj

adds to the appearance of confusion discussed under "context"above,
which enhances the perception that OCSE was arbitrary. Furthermore, the
methodology even arguably violates thestatutorily©based requirement that
Utah account for, and OCSEcollect, the interest, since OCSE does not
deny that themethodology consciously ignores interest on
carryovercollections. . TR, pp. 80©1. (Even counsel for OCSE was
notunmindful of this.  ”Id•., and pp. 91©2).  Also, the approachpresents
an accounting anomaly:  a collection deposit on the lastday of the prior
quarter would be ascribed only that one day'sinterest in that quarter,
even though it carried forward throughthe following quarter, whereas a
collection made on the very nextday (the first day of the following
quarter) would be ascribedinterest throughout the quarter.  TR, pp.
80©1.

In summary, despite OCSE's apparently good intentions, OCSE'smethodology
”as applied in the facts of this case• appears to beeven more arbitrary
than in the earlier case.

c.  ”Reasonableness of Utah's approach•.

In ”Utah I•, we concluded that the State bore a burden ofaccounting for
the interest, that the State's commingling offunds from various state
and federal sources was a cause of thedispute, and that the State's
approach at that time (whichbasically used principal amounts of
undistributed IV©Dcollections remaining at the end of the quarter as a
basis forcalculating interest) was too imprecise.  For reasons
alreadydescribed, we remanded to give Utah an opportunity to
establish"through reasonable documentation the actual amount of
interestearned." ”Utah I•, p. 13.

Subsequently, OCSE personnel developed an "action plan" with aschedule
for development of a methodology and met with Statepersonnel.  One
element of the plan called for OCSE to review"All relevant State fiscal
transactions" and "The distributionprocessing [sic] of funds between
IV©D and IV©A programs." Utah'sAppeal File, Document 2; Utah's Brief,
pp. 1©2; TR, pp. 74©7;OCSE's Brief, p. 3.

Utah in fact did develop a more sophisticated methodology
whichsubstantially relied on tracking IV©A warrants (warrants are
likechecks issued to assistance recipients

which they can cash anywhere).  Utah explained the core conceptsof its
approach as follows:

Ì .ÌSince IV©D collections were deposited directly into theState's
general fund, from which warrants for assistancepayments were paid,
those collections were immediatelyavailable upon deposit.  That
availabil¬ity was the State'sÜj

Ì .ÌSince IV©A draws [”i.e.•, the State's drawdowns from .itsfederal
letter of credit] were also depositedÞ.JÞ Ì .Ìin the general fund, the
records of deposits andexpenditures from the fund do not alone reveal
whether IV#Dfunds were d#stributed first, at the same time, or after
theIV©A funds were distributed.  Any of the three situationscould be
assumed with some good reasons.  However, it ismost reasonable to assume
that funds from the two sourceswere distributed at the same time for
purposes ofdetermining reasonable interest on IV©D collections
awaitingdistribution.Þ.JÞ

Ì .ÌIV©D collections deposited in the general fund during onemonth were
totally distributed for assistance paymentsduring the month after they
were collected . . . [pursuantto] 45 CFR 302.51(b)(2). . . . Proof that
the collectionswere actually distributed as indicated is found in a
carefulanalysis of the records of deposits of IV©A draws, netdeposits of
IV©D collections, and IV©A expenditures.  See[Appeal File] documents 3
through 6.  Utah's Brief, pp. 5©6;”see• ”also• TR, pp. 104©5.Þ.JÞ

Ì .ÌBased on the foregoing, Utah said it made a reasonableassumption
that IV©D collections were distributed each monthin proportion to the
IV©A AFDC funds, and it devised aformula for calculating interest based
on this principle ofproportionality.  The record contains detail on the
steps inthe calculation process.  Utah's Brief, pp. 7©8, anddocuments
cited.  Utah represented the calculations asdefinitive and based on
accurate, hard data.  ”See•, ”e.g.•, TR,p. 111.Þ.JÞ

Ì .ÌOCSE then disregarded its "action plan" and refused toreview Utah's
documentation.  The State's witness testifiedthat a regional OCSE
auditor said, essentially, "we havereceived the instruction from
Rockville on how to distributeand I won't be looking at the records."
TR,Þ.JÞ

p. 76.  The instruction apparently was PIQ©86©1. ”Id•.  OCSE didnot
dispute this.

OCSE essentially objected in principle to the State'smethodology, as we
have discussed above and discuss furtherbelow.  We note here, however,
that nothing in the recordindicates that Utah did anything other than
make a good faitheffort to develop an adequate methodology.  Utah did
develop anew and relatively sophisticated presentation in response to
ourconcerns in ”Utah I•, and the methodology, on its face, with acaveat
noted below, appears to be a reasonable enough approach tocalculating
the interest for the quarter in question that OCSEwas unreasonable in
rejecting it out of hand.Üj ”Analysis of OCSE's objections•.

a.  ”OCSE's arguments from prior Board decisions•.

OCSE made several overlapping arguments to the effect that Utahdid not
meet tests for acceptable methodologies established bythe Board.  OCSE's
Brief, pp. 2©8; TR, p. 102.

OCSE said that in ”Utah I• the Board rejected Utah's argument thatIV©A
federal funding deficits essentially should offset IV©Ddeposits.  OCSE's
Brief, p. 5.  Utah did briefly reassert thisargument here.  Utah's
Brief, p. 2.  OCSE is correct that wespecifically rejected this approach
in ”Utah I• (”see• pp. 4©5, 7),and we reaffirm that decision here.
However, as we have alreadyindicated, this does not mean that all
evidence drawn from therelationship of Titles IV©A and IV©D is
irrelevant to thequestion of whether Utah's revised methodology was
unreasonablyrejected by OCSE.

OCSE also argued that Utah's new methodology was "only avariation" of
what it had presented earlier, in the sense that"both ”assume• a
relationship between IV©D collections and IV©Aexpenditures without
actually demonstrating its existence."OCSE's Brief, p. 6.  As already
explained, Utah did considerablymore than merely reiterate former
arguments, and OCSE's failureto examine Utah's newly offered
documentation (as it originallyindicated it would) undermines its
credibility concerning whatthe documentation actually showed.  The Board
did ”not• reject allevidence derived from the IV©A/IV©D relationship; we
rejected theidea of overturning a IV©D disallowance based on shortfalls
infederal funding in IV©A.  In ”Utah I•, our

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"test" basically was no more than that the State had to"document, rather
than speculate on" the amount of interest.  p.12.  OCSE found far more
definition in our earlier decisions thanwe can when it argued that
Utah's methodology does not "conformto any of those previously approved
by the Board." OCSE's Brief,p. 7.  OCSE described these acceptable
methodologies as includingcomputations based on the four corners of a
IV©A quarterlyreport; "effective crediting" through actual use of funds
tolower needs for federal cash; and crediting in the context
ofregulating letter of credit drawdowns.  ”Id•., p. 3.  We agree thatwe
likely would find these methods acceptable, although thedirect relevance
of the third in this context is unclear. ## Inany event, what we found
acceptable in particular facts.elsewhereestablishes no negative
stricture on what we might findacceptable in the facts here.  Even OCSE
acknowledged that themethods it says we found acceptable do not
"constitute anexhaustive list." OCSE's Brief, p. 8.  Üj

”                    •

 This part of the argument apparently derives from OCSE'sreading
 of the Board's ”Indiana• decision, which involved
 differentissues.  ”Indiana• involved a dispute over delay in
 crediting thefederal share of Medicaid and AFDC collections
 deposited in acommon pool which was 95% invested in
 interest©bearinginstruments or accounts.  A principal focus in
 the case was onIndiana's alleged prefinancing of the federal
 share of programcosts, and the Board indicated that calculation
 of interestearned might be affected if Indiana effectively
 credited thefederal account with collections by advancing
 equivalent sums tocover program costs or otherwise reduced
 drawdowns of federalfunds.  The Board found that Indiana had
 presented inadequateevidence of balances in accounts and timing
 of fund adjustments,collections and refunds.  While federal
 auditors had madespecific determinations from State records of
 those facts, thatwas a factual determination specific to the
 evidence in that caseand directed at a different issue than we
 face here.

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evidence before us at the time (including an incomplete record onthe
details of issuance and redemption of warrants).  Wetherefore reject
OCSE's argument that the Board establishedvarious "tests" which Utah
failed to pass; our concern simply wasto elicit evidence, if it existed,
of the amount of interest in aparticular factual setting which included
a questionable OCSEcalculation.

b.  ”Objections to Utah's methodology as an alternative•.

OCSE argued that Utah made an insufficient case for substitutingits
methodology for OCSE's methodology, based on points discussedbelow.

At the outset, it should be noted that the Board never merelysubstitutes
its judgment for that of the HHS constituent agency,that we give
deference to agency decision©making, and that wewould not find for an
appellant merely because we judge itsposition to be as reasonable as the
agency's.  Generally, theremust be an affirmative showing that the
agency's determination iswrong, not just that the appellant's contrary
determination maybe equally valid; the appellant generally has the
burden to showin the given factual context that the agency determination
isÜj

OCSE argued that Utah's methodology is inadequate because it
is"hypothetical." OCSE's Brief, p. 9.  Although this is an
undulypejorative description of the State's effort, one might agreethat
it is hypothetical in the sense that it does not actuallytrack and
display each specific dollar of interest.  If so, thenOCSE's preferred
methodology is similarly hypothetical since itattributes interest to
periods late in the quarter when theactual amount of interest is unknown
and may be nonexistent. OCSE generally insisted that its approach is
meticulouslyaccurate, but in the context of the IV©A/IV©D relationship
it isdisingenuous to ignore the fact that some portion of IV©D fundsis
distributed through AFDC warrants, and that substituting theIV©D
collections for IV©A cash does

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effectively distribute the funds to the IV©A program. Furthermore, by
virtue of the relatively recent decision toeliminate an opening balance,
OCSE's approach can becharacterized as hypothetical or "artificial." ##
The realconcern should be whether Utah's methodology is reasonable as
ameans of determining this interest with a substantial degree
ofaccuracy.  We note that HHS constituent agencies frequently
usesampling and statistical analysis to estimate disallowances whichare
not actual measurements but are, nonetheless, 90% to 95%reliable.

OCSE also made the separate argument that the artificiality ofUtah's
approach was shown in Utah's acknowledgment that itassumed.a
"proportionate dollar" distribution of IV©D funds atthe same time as the
distribution of IV©A funds, rather thanbefore or after.  OCSE's Brief,
p. 10; TR, pp. 89©91.  Ourobservations in the paragraph above are also
applicable here inresponse.  In addition, the State's proportionality
approachappears reasonable as the State explained it (and as a matter
ofcommon sense), and OCSE chose not to go into the details of
thebackground documentation the State offered in support of
itscalculations.  At the hearing, OCSE argued that the complexity ofthe
IV©A/IV©D funding relationship needed to be considered ingreater detail,
and that one cannot accept the proportionatedollar approach "in a
vacuum, which I believe they have." TR, p.91.  OCSE suggested that the
interaction between the timing ofIV©A draws on the letter of credit (and
the fact that interestearned on the AFDC funds does not have to be
accounted for) mightaffect the fairness of the proportionate dollar
approach, andÜj

”                    •

”6•/ OCSE's counsel said, "It's as artificial [as the State's], butit's
certainly not unfavorable to the State." TR, p. 85.

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concern about the IV©A/IV©D funding interrelationship actuallyhighlights
the difficulty of OCSE's expedient but questionabledesire to ignore
anything other than IV©D dollars ”per• ”se•; andsecond, to the extent
OCSE arguably identified a valid questionabout the State's methodology,
it is not sufficient in and ofitself to establish the reasonableness of
the disallowance.

OCSE also argued that it was incorrect to use the date ofissuance of a
warrant as opposed to the date of redemption of theissued warrant.
OCSE's Brief, pp. 9©10.  It is clear that inUtah, funds continued to
earn interest after issuance of thewarrant until redeemed.  TR, pp. 65,
92©3.  Utah maintained thatit was impossible to track redemptions on a
warrant©by©warrantbasis.  TR, p. 95.  Utah indicated #hat most warrants
were cashedquickly by recipients and that banks also quickly sought
fundsfrom the State treasury; there was testimony that the averagetime
from issuance to redemption might be only two days.  TR, pp.43©4.  Utah
argued that the funds lost their character as IV©Dfunds upon issuance of
the warrant and that elsewhere HHS hasused issuance dates as an
expedient accounting device fordifferent purposes.  Utah's Brief, p. 7;
TR, p. 93.  We do notfind Utah's arguments persuasive because it is
clear thatinterest was in fact earned until redemption and that the
Stateis specifically accountable for interest under Title IV©D. Although
perhaps not the only possible policy, it is notunreasonable for OCSE to
take the position that interestcontinues to be earned on IV©D funds
until the funds are actuallypaid out.  However, it appears that the
amount in issue is notsubstantial, and could be accommodated by some
agreed uponadjustment.  Thus, although Utah's methodology is flawed in
thisrespect, the flaw appears minor and correctable.

”Conclusion•.

Based on the foregoing analysis, we have determined that OCSE'sÜj

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adjustment to accommodate our determination that OCSE is correctin
the.facts of this case concerning Utah's improper use of theissuance
date; examples of adjustment methodologies©©there may beothers©©which
seem reasonable include using the results of asample of actual redeemed
warrants or using the average two©dayredemption period suggested at the
hearing. ##

 

 

 

     ##dith #._Ballard_

         ”
         •

     ”
     • Alexander G. T#itz .

 


       ” ©  ###    #©#
       #./i   #    # .
       #   • Norval D.
     #John) Settle Presiding Board
     Member

 

 

 

”                    •

 In ”Utah I•, we indicated that it would be appropriate touphold
 the disallowance in the amount of $7,789 based on Utah'sposition
 that this was a more accurate amount than OCSE's.  ”UtahI•, p.
 8.  Utah protested that its position was not an admission,but
 merely part of an argument related to the substantive issueÜj