GAB Decision 343
September 28, 1982 Life Planning/Health Service, Inc.; Docket No. 82-7
Garrett, Donald; Teitz, Alexander Settle, Norval
Life Planning/Health Services, Inc. of Dallas, Texas (Grantee)
appealed a decision by the Public Health Service Regional Grant Appeal
Board (PHS, Agency) affirming the denial by the Agency of Grantree's
request for approval to purchase a second vehicle at a cost of $9800, to
be used to transport Grantee's board members, county committee members,
visitors and members of Grantee's staff. The Agency had approved the
purchase of one vehicle for delivering supplies, transporting patients,
and other purposes related to delivery of health services to patients
using family planning clinics operated by Grantee.
The Board initially questioned whether it had jurisdiction in this
case, because the regulations under which the Board has operated since
September 30, 1981 do not give the Board jurisdiction over an appeal
from the denial of a request to incur an expenditure during the period
of a grant. The notice of appeal is dated January 22, 1982. In its
response to the Board's memorandum of February 10, 1982, the Agency said
that the PHS decision affirmed the denial of Grantee's request to
purchase, but noted that in the proceeding before this Board, Grantee
sought to be reimbursed for the purchase of the second vehicle. The
Agency asked the Board to take jurisdiction, and on March 24, 1982, we
did so.
Since the dispute concerns an amount under $25,000, and appellant
received a review of its complaint by a grant appeal committee before
coming to this Board, the Board's special expedited review procedures
apply. 45 CFR 16.12(d) (1981).Thus, we reviewed the record in this case
to determine whether PHS' determination was clearly erroneous. Section
16.12(d)(1). Grantee was advised of this standard by letter dated June
14, 1982.
Grantee did not contest the Agency's position that prior approval by
the Agency was required for the purchase of the vehicle in question.
The issue was whether the Agency's decision to withhold its approval was
clearly erroneous under the circumstances here. We find it was not and
uphold the Agency decision. Our holding is based on the parties'
submissions and the telephone conferences with both parties on July 28,
1982, and with Grantee's attorney on August 26, 1982 (as reflected in
the summaries of the conferences).
(2) DISCUSSION
Grantee admitted that it sought and was denied approval for purchase
of a second vehicle, but purchased it anyway. May 15, 1982 Appeal.
Grantee alleged that the vehicle was needed to transport community
representatives to the various clinics operated by Grantee and that such
visits were an important means of obtaining the community participation
required by Agency regulations. Grantee also alleged that public
transportation was not available at all locations and that many of the
community representatives, including community leaders, did not have
other means of transportation. In a telephone conference, Grantee
repeated those allegations, contended that purchase of the second
vehicle reduced travel expenses, and claimed that approval had been
given in prior years for Grantee to have two vehicles. A subsequent
filing by Grantee alleged that a second vehicle previously owned by
Grantee had been purchashed with United Way funds to transport clinical
equipment to sites established at the request of the Department of
Housing and Urban Development and the Community Colleges of Dallas.
August 10, 1982 Submission.
The Agency stated that a review of its files showed that prior to the
instance on appeal, it had in the past approved only one vehicle, a
"Medical Bus." This vehicle was described in materials submitted in
a
June 6, 1974 budget revision as a transport for clinical equipment.
August 13, 1982 Agency Submission. The Agency asserted that in practice
the only justification it accepted for vehicle purchases was patient
services and transportation of employees and supplies. Ibid.
Grantee's attorney stated in the July 28 telephone conference that
there were sufficient unobligated funds to cover the cost of the second
vehicle, although she could not identify the grant budget lines from
which the reimbursement could be made. Although the Board gave the
Grantee an additional opportunity to submit appeal materials, it did not
do so.
We find that Grantee's effort fell far short of meeting the clearly
erroneous standard. Grantee failed to show that the purchase of a
second vehicle was the only means of meeting the community participation
requirement. It did not controvert the Agency's position that as a
matter of policy vehicle purchases were approved only for patient
services and transportation of employees and supplies. It did not even
substantiate its claim that there were unspent grant funds available to
reimburse it for the second vehicle or that it had received approval in
the past from the Agency to purchase two vehicles. (3) At best, Grantee
demonstrated that it acted reasonably and with good intent. This is not
sufficient to overturn the Agency where no error (much less clear error)
has been shown.
Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, we uphold the Agency decision.
OCTOBER 22, 1983