**Akira Ransomware**

**Executive Summary**

Akira is a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) group that started operations in March 2023. Since its discovery, the group has claimed over 60 victims, which have typically ranged in the small- to medium-size business scale. Akira has garnered attention for a couple of reasons, such as their retro 1980s-themed website (see figure below) and the considerable demands for ransom payments ranging from $200,000 to $4 million. Akira has been observed obtaining initial malware delivery through several methods, such as leveraging compromised credentials and exploiting weaknesses in virtual private networks (VPN), typically where multi-factor authentication (MFA) is not being used. Like many ransomware groups, they employed the double-extortion technique against their victims by exfiltrating data prior to encryption. It is also believed that the group may contain some affiliation with Conti due to observed overlap in their code and cryptocurrency wallets. The group has targeted multiple sectors, including finance, real estate, manufacturing, and healthcare.

**Overview of Akira**

The Akira ransomware was first seen in March 2023. In 2017, another ransomware named Akira was observed, but these two are not considered to be associated. The Akira ransomware targets Windows and Linux systems. The Windows variant is a 64-bit Windows binary that was written in C++, the ransomware creates a symmetric key encrypted by the RSA-4096 cipher.

![Akira Data Leak Site (Source: Bleeping Computer)](imageURL)

It avoids encrypting files with .exe, .lnk, .dll, .msi, .sys, and akira_readme.txt. Additionally, it avoids the winnt, temp, thumb, $Recycle.bin, $RECYCLE.BIN, system volume information, boot, windows, and Trend
Micro folders.

The Linux version of Akira is also a 64-bit executable, which targets VMware ESXi servers and behaves similarly to the Windows variant, except the Windows version uses the Windows CryptoAPI and the Linux version uses the Crypto++ library. Bleeping Computer has noted that “Akira's encryptors do not contain many advanced features, such as the automatic shutting down of virtual machines before encrypting files using the esxcli command.” The command line does contain arguments which would allow the attacker to customize their attacks:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Argument</th>
<th>Function</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-p --encryption_path</td>
<td>targeted file/folder paths</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-s --share_file</td>
<td>targeted network drive path</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-n --encryption_percent</td>
<td>percentage of encryption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--fork</td>
<td>create a child process for encryption</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Linux file extensions targeted by Akira (Source: Bleeping Computer)

Akira has obtained many of its initial compromises by leveraging compromised credentials. Additionally, many of the targeted organizations did not have multi-factor authentication (MFA) enabled on their virtual private networks (VPN). It is unknown how the credentials were originally obtained, but it is possible that they were purchased from the dark web. Additional distribution methods have included phishing emails, malicious websites, drive-by download attacks, and trojans. Once infected, the malware will launch PowerShell to remove shadow volume copies, and once encryption is complete, the file’s extension will be reassigned with the “.akira” extension. The attackers also attempt lateral movement and privilege escalation through LSASS credential dumps.

Before encryption, the ransomware group exfiltrates the victim’s data to employ the double-extortion tactic on their victims. If the ransom is not paid, the group threatens to release the sensitive information to the public. The group also offers victims a lower-cost option to not pay for a decryptor and to not have the especially sensitive information published.
While the ransom note is written in English, it contains several grammatical errors within it. The note instructs the victims to contact them via their TOR site, where each victim is given a unique login password for conducting negotiations. The ransom note also offers organizations a full security report from Akira, which claims to release an audit of the victims network and the vulnerabilities that the group was able to exploit.

The group utilizes a range of tools during the course of the incident, as indicated from incident response data. Some of these include the PCHunter toolkit, port scanner MASSCAN, Mimikatz for credential harvesting, WinSCP, and PsExec to name a few.

**Affiliation With Other Groups**

Security researchers have noticed that the Akira ransomware has some similarities with the disbanded Conti ransomware group. This was a result of some identified code overlap and the implementation of ChaCha 2008, as well as the code for key generation, both of which resemble the one used by Conti. The list directory exclusions that it avoids encrypting, including winnt and Trend Micro, are also the same in both ransomware strains.

In a pattern analysis of cryptocurrency wallets, researchers were able to identify overlap in the wallets between Akira and Conti. In two of these transactions, the wallets had previously been affiliated with
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September 12, 2023     TLP:CLEAR     Report: 202309121400

Conti’s leadership team.

Blockchain transactions between Akira and Conti (Source: Artic Wolf)

**Indicators of Compromise**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Avast’s Indicators of Compromise</th>
<th>Windows Version</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>5c62626731856fb5e669473b39ac3deb0052b32981863f8cf697ae01c80512e5</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Avast’s Indicator of Compromise

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Linux Version</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1d3b5c650533d13c81e325972a912e3ff8776e36e18bca966dae50735f8ab296</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Recent Reporting**

On August 22, 2023, reports have shown that Akira has started to target Cisco VPN products to gain access to corporate networks, reportedly on those that do not have MFA enabled.
Researchers from SentinelOne have also observed newer tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) from the ransomware gang, such as SQL database manipulation, disabling firewalls, and disabling LSA protection. Additionally, the group has used RustDesk, a legitimate remote access tool. Since RustDesk is a legitimate tool, it is less likely to trigger any alarms for defenders, all while allowing attackers to maintain remote access.

**Mitigations**

The Akira ransomware has been delivered through several methods, and HC3 encourages the following mitigations to help protect your organization:

- Implement a strong password policy
- Educate and train users
- Enable multi-factor authentication
- Update and patch systems regularly
- Implementing account lockout policies to defend against brute force attacks
- Implementing a recovery and incident response plan
- Implement network segmentation

**References**


Antoniuk, Daryna. “Akira ransomware compromised at least 63 victims since March, report says”. July 26,

“Akira Ransomware: In-Depth Analysis, Detection, and Mitigation”. SentinelOne.
https://www.sentinelone.com/anthology/akira/

https://devel.group/blog/akira-ransomware-targets-linux/#:~:text=Recent%20research%20reveals%20that%20the,actively%20targeting%20multiple%20organizations%20worldwide.


https://decoded.avast.io/threatresearch/decrypted-akira-ransomware/


**Contact Information**
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